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What countermeasures best strengthen the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) 
of the implementation of cloud computing within the DoD?  This question will be 
answered by analyzing threats and countermeasures within the context of the ten domains 
comprising the Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP) Common 
Body of Knowledge (CBK).  The ten domains that will be used in this analysis include 
access control; telecommunications and network security; information security 
governance and risk management; application security; cryptography; security 
architecture and design; operations security; business continuity planning and disaster 
planning; legal regulations, compliance, and investigation; and physical security.  The 
results of this research provide a comprehensive guide for any DoD entity attempting to 
secure its cloud solution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What countermeasures best strengthen the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) 
of the implementation of cloud computing1 within the DoD?  This question will be 
answered by analyzing threats and countermeasures within the context of the ten domains 
comprising the Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP) Common 
Body of Knowledge (CBK).  The ten domains that will be used in this analysis include 
access control, telecommunications and network security, information security 
governance and risk management, application security, cryptography, security 
architecture and design, operations security, business continuity planning and disaster 
planning; legal regulations, compliance, and investigation; and physical security.2 The 
results of this research provide a comprehensive guide for any DoD entity attempting to 
secure its cloud solution. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
A vital DoD interest is to protect its information systems to ensure the CIA of 
critical data at home and abroad.  In order to protect DoD information infrastructures 
within the context of cloud computing, the tactics and insight of network security 
professionals on both threats and corresponding countermeasures provide invaluable 
references necessary for deterring malicious attacks from U.S. adversaries.    
The Obama Administration is encouraging a push for agencies to implement 
cloud computing when operational efficiencies and financial benefits are evident.3  This 
push is accompanied with a requirement for cyber security.  On May 29, 2009, President 
                                                 
1 Cloud computing is a virtual infrastructure aimed to provide shared information and communication 
technology services, via a cloud, for many external users through use of the Internet. 
2  Shon Harris, All-in-one CISSP Exam Guide (New York: McGraw Hill, 2010), 7. 
3 Rutrel Yasin, “House panel questions cloud computing assumptions,” Government Computer News, 
July 1, 2010, at: http://gcn.com/articles/2010/07/01/congress-hearings-on-cloud-computing.aspx (accessed 




Obama named cyber security as a top economic and national security priority as a result 
of his 60-day review that called for securing information systems used by the government 
and the U.S. economy.  Moreover, he stated,  
[P]rotecting this infrastructure will be a national security priority. We will 
ensure that these networks are secure, trustworthy and resilient.  We will 
deter, prevent, detect, and defend against attacks and recover quickly from 
any disruptions or damage.4   
The analysis of threats and countermeasures in each of the ten domains of the 
CISSP CBK will provide lessons learned to ensure a secure implementation of cloud 
computing within the DoD.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated the U.S. is "under cyber attack virtually 
all the time, every day."5  The DoD reported spending over $100 million from September 
2008 to March 2009 on repairs to damage resulting from cyber attacks.6 In 2008, the 
DoD removed 1,500 computers from the Pentagon’s unclassified network due to a cyber 
attack, and in the fall of 2008 banned external removable media devices to prevent the 
spread of viruses.7  Brigadier General John A. Davis, commander of the Joint Task Force 
for Global Network Operations, after a cyberspace conference in Omaha, Nebraska, 
stated that investments are necessary up front on computer countermeasures rather than 
later for repairs.8  
                                                 
4  Brian Krebs, “Obama: Cyber security is a National Security Priority,” The Washington Post, May 
29, 2009, at: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/05/obama_cybersecurity_is_a_natio.html 
(accessed Jun 13, 2010). 
5  CBS Interactive Staff, “DoD Gates: We’re always under cyberattack,” ZDNet, April 22, 2009, at: 
http://www.zdnet.com/news/dod-gates-were-always-under-cyberattack/290770 (accessed May 17, 2010). 
6  Elinor Mills, “Pentagon Spends Over $100 million on cyberattack cleanup,”  CNET News,  April 7, 
2009, at: http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10214416-83.html (accessed May 17 , 2010). 
7  Ibid. 
8  Lolita C. Baldor, “Pentagon spends $100M to fix Cyber Attacks,” Physorg.com, April 7, 2009, at: 




DoD information security is so diverse that military services and components are 
challenged to focus their efforts.  Sims and Gerber in their book “Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence,” recommend the following areas be addressed: 
Decreasing the inherent vulnerabilities within our hardware and software; 
increasing the difficulty of an adversary introducing vulnerabilities into 
our systems through life-cycle approaches; increasing our ability to deeply 
evaluate critical components-design for evaluation; increasing the cost and 
uncertainty to an adversary attempting to exploit our vulnerabilities; 
increasing the probability of detecting a component (hardware or 
software) behaving badly (violating a security requirement); increasing the 
probability of attributing bad behavior to an adversary; increasing the 
consequences to the attacker for bad behavior.9 
With the DoD’s latest implementation of cloud computing in the past two years, 
security remains a major concern.  The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), in consultation 
with thirty commercial security experts, published a report on the top security threats 
with cloud computing.  These threats included:  nefarious personnel working for cloud 
computing providers, malicious attackers targeting providers, lack of security in 
interfaces or application programming interfaces (APIs), vulnerabilities in shared 
technology, data loss or leakage; and lastly, service hijacking.10 
In April 2010, CSA published results from a survey on cyber security stating that 
seventy percent of 198 respondents from across the military and government are 
“concerned about [the] data security, privacy and integrity” of cloud computing.11  Also, 
during the latest Cloud Computing Summit in Washington, D.C., May 2010, the main 
lesson was “caveat emptor,” which means “buyers beware” in Latin.12  
One of the main problems with cloud computing is that a customer, such as the 
DoD, places trust in the protection of data (for privacy and security) with an outside 
                                                 
9 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, Transforming U.S. Intelligence  (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005),106–107. 
10  Barbara DePompa. “The Cloud’s Standard Imperative,” Defense Systems: Knowledge Technologies 
and Net-Centric Warfare, May 5, 2010, at:  http://defensesystems.com/microsites/2010/cloud-
computing/cloud-standards-imperative.aspx (accessed May 29, 2010). This hack took place 4 May 2010. 
11  Ibid. 




commercial vendor.  Since data is on the cloud, the IT management team of the cloud 
controls the security and privacy settings.  Moreover, providers often work with third-
party venders, and it is difficult to guarantee how all these interweaved parties safeguard 
data.13   
1. Cloud Vulnerability 
There are several incidents that highlight the need for DoD diligence with security 
in its adoption of cloud computing.  CIA are of major concern for cloud computing in 
consideration of a rogue hacker, data outages, and data loss.   
a. Hacked 
The U.S. Treasury was recently negatively affected when the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing’s (BEP’s) website was forced offline because its cloud computing 
vender was attacked using malicious code.14   Another recent malicious attack transpired 
when a hacker allegedly gained access to a Twitter employee’s personal email and 
Google apps account.15  As a result, 310 of Twitter’s financial notes and documents were 
downloaded from Google’s cloud application, and subsequently circulated around the 
Internet.  
b. Outage 
After routine maintenance, servers at Gmail malfunctioned and caused a 
100 minute outage on September 1, 2009.16  In reference to the recent outages by Google, 
Microsoft, and Amazon, Tim O’Brien, director of platform strategy at Microsoft, stated, 
                                                 
13  Karthik Kumar and Yung-Hsiang Lu. “Cloud Computing for Mobile Users: Can Offloading 
Computation Save Energy?” Computer, Vol. 44, No. 4 (April 2010),1–14. 
14  DePompa, “The Cloud’s Standard Imperative.”  
15 John D. Sutter, “Twitter hack raises questions about cloud computing,” CNN.com, July 16, 2009, at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/07/16/twitter.hack/index.html (accessed July 13, 2010). 
16 Ben Traynor, “More on Today’s Gmail Issue,” The Official Gmail Blog, 9 September 2009, at: 




“outages are just a reality…[e]ven if you do your due diligence, you still have to manage 
around these risks.”17  
c. Data Loss 
When Microsoft’s Danger subsidiary failed, T-Mobile Sidekick mobile 
phone users experienced not only an outage, but also lost data in their contacts, calendar, 
and address book.18  Sidekick’s cloud solution with Microsoft failed and cost both 
companies reliability points with customers.19  
These incidents clearly highlight the vulnerability of placing trust in cloud 
computing.  Cloud security experts today, such as Dr. Bret Michael of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, assert that, “[i]t is unclear whether the current set of [cloud] 
services is sufficiently secure and reliable for use in sensitive government 
environments.”20  Moreover, Michael states, “[t]he current architectural approaches, 
especially those concerning security, may not scale to the much larger cloud computing 
approaches.”21  Clearly, there is cause for concern. 
2. Addressing the Vulnerability 
According to Heather Wald, an assurance and resiliency consultant for the 
Department of Commerce, many government agencies are concerned about inherent risks 
in cloud computing, but are lured by a potentially “cheaper, easier, and more secure” 
solution.22  With many potential benefits offered by cloud, the DoD should continue to 
seriously investigate and address the risks associated with securing this architecture. 
                                                 
17 Traynor, “More on Today’s Gmail Issue.” 
18 Ina Fried, “Software outage casts cloud over Microsoft,” CNET News, October 10, 2009, at: 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13860_3-10372525-56.html (accessed June 14, 2010). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Bret Michael and George Dinolt, "Establishing Trust in Cloud Computing," Information Assurance 
(IA) Newsletter, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 2010), 6. 
21 Ibid. 
22  Heather Wald, "Cloud Computing for the Federal Community," Information Assurance Newsletter, 




The purpose of this thesis is to identify countermeasures that will strengthen the 
security posture of cloud computing for the DoD.  This is done by using the ten domains 
of the CISSP CBK as a framework for examining cloud security recommendations.    
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will include a historical analysis of threats and attacks against cloud 
computing, as well as countermeasures within the context of the ten domains of the 
CISSP CBK.  The ten domains of the CISSP CBK provide a framework for the areas of 
research, along with a variety of text books, industry web sites (such as the U.S. 
Computer Emergency Response Team), professional journals and the most current 
articles from computer security publications.  
E. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
Chapter I addressed the major research question of this thesis and why it is 
important.  It also covered problems and hypothesis, and methods and sources.  Chapter 
II reviews the literature in order to define cloud computing, stipulate pros and cons of 
cloud computing, describe the four types of cloud solutions and cloud service models, 
describe current instances of clouds in the DoD, justify and characterize the ten domains, 
and identify security advantages and challenges of cloud computing.  Chapter III 
discusses the future of cloud computing in the federal government and the DoD.  Chapter 
IV stipulates the inherent risk of using an external provider or even managing an internal 
cloud.  Chapter V dissects the ten domains for threats and countermeasures as they apply 






II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. WHAT IS CLOUD COMPUTING? 
Cloud computing is an evolving paradigm with changing definitions, but for this 
research project, it is defined as a virtual infrastructure which provides shared 
information and communication technology services, via an internet “cloud,” for 
“multiple external users” through use of the Internet or “large-scale private networks.”23  
Cloud computing provides a computer user access to Information Technology (IT) 
services (i.e., applications, servers, data storage) without requiring an understanding of 
the technology or even ownership of the infrastructure.24   
To comprehend cloud computing, an analogy to an electricity computing grid is 
useful.  A power company maintains and owns the infrastructure, a distribution company 
disseminates the electricity, and the consumer merely uses the resources without 
ownership or operational responsibilities.25   Similarly, a user’s cloud computing access 
enables “shared resources, software, and information on-demand” on a fee-for-service 
basis.26    
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), cloud 
computing exhibits several characteristics:27 
 “On-demand self-service”—users can automatically request and obtain 
provisions of “server time and network storage.”  
 "Broad network access"—access to network is available through multiple 
platforms (i.e., cellular phones, laptops, and Personal Digital Assistants); 
                                                 
23  Joseph Katzman and Fred Donovan, “Head in the Clouds: DoD Turns to Cloud Computing,” 
Defense Industry Daily. May 25, 2010, at: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/defense-cloud-computing-
06387/ (accessed May 29, 2010). 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 




 "Resource pooling"—the provider collocates resources (applications, 
memory, bandwidth, virtual machines) to service many users regardless of 
location. 
 "Rapid elasticity"—resources are provided quickly (often automatically) 
and in a scalable manner (more is available and provided if more is needed 
and less is provided if less is needed). 
 "Utility Computing"—the provider transparently meters, monitors, 
controls and documents service usage for billing. 
B. PROS AND CONS TO CLOUD COMPUTING 
The services within cloud computing contain a layered architecture of resources 
with many benefits.  First, the IT network is managed by an external provider, and the 
customer does not need to maintain servers, train IT employees or even purchase 
software licenses.28  This lowers monetary costs in personnel requirements/training, 
power, infrastructure maintenance, and storage space.29   Cloud computing increases 
scalability (computer capability can grow in response to increases in customer demand), 
expediency in new service roll out, availability (a loss of one component will not 
disconnect all components), and mobility (the ability to telecommute).30  Cloud 
computing increases the flexibility of organizations due to information sharing and 
collaboration (multi-tenancy).31   
The services and architecture of cloud computing contain some areas of concern. 
Security implementations will require additional monetary resources to implement.32  
Turning data turned over to a third party cloud provider creates concerns with trust 
(privacy and security of data).33  An increased geographic distance between users and 
                                                 
28  Katzman and Donovan, “Head in the Clouds: DoD Turns to Cloud Computing.” 
29 Heather Wald,  “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.”  Information Assurance Newletter, 
Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 2010), 14. 
30 Manish Pokharel and Jong Sou Park, “Cloud Computing: Future solution for e-Governance,” ACM, 
2009: 408–410. 
31 Katzman and Donovan, “Head in the Clouds: DoD Turns to Cloud Computing.”  
32 Wald,  “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.”   




applications/data can introduce latency problems.34  Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
with providers are less robust than required for a company providing IT services.  
Governance and security standards in regard to cloud computing are currently lacking.  
Centralization of data presents security concerns, in addition to nefarious use of cloud 
computing architectures.    
C.  CLOUD COMPUTING DEPLOYMENT MODELS  
There are four types of clouds that the DoD can potentially invest: public 
(external), private (internal), community (a subset of public/private), and hybrid 
(combination of any two or more above).   
1. Public Cloud 
A public cloud provides shared resources via a web application to many unrelated 
customers; the provider maintains the cloud.35  Billing is based on a utility-type 
configuration.  The Department of Navy Chief Information Officer stated, “Public clouds 
are not necessarily appropriate for Army or Navy information to be just sitting out 
there.”36  
Two benefits to a public cloud are that it is cost effective; and an external 
provider performs the security.37  Two detractors to a public cloud solution include: 
client concerns about the level of security, and the difficulties with a provider showing 
securing compliance.38 
                                                 
34 Frederic Paul, “Cloud Computing’s Dirty Little Secret,” Enterprise Efficiency, August 30, 2010, at: 
http://www.enterpriseefficiency.com/author.asp?section_id=898&doc_id=196259 (accessed October 2, 
2010). 
35  Wald, “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.”  
36 Dorothy Ramienski, “DoD IT experts open up about cloud deployment,” Federal Executive Forum, 
November 10, 2009, at: http://www.federalnewsradio.com/index.php?nid=35&sid=1808816 (accessed 
August 11, 2010).  
37  Wald, “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.”  




2. Private Cloud 
A private cloud is built, managed, and directly controlled by the customer, and 
deemed the most secure type of cloud solution when correctly managed.39  Another 
definition of a private cloud is a cloud infrastructure  
…operated solely for a single organization.  It may be managed by the 
organization or a third party, and may exist on premises or off-premises.40   
The private cloud is the preferred implementation for the DoD, as per Mr. Robert 
F. Lentz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, for Cyber, Identify and IA, in his 
speech to the House of Representatives on May 5, 2009.41  Some of the benefits to a 
private cloud solution include, (1) it was deemed the “most secure model” based on a 
client implementing the solution in a secure manner; and (2) it is a "more efficient use of 
physical IT assets" when contrasted with a traditional data center.42 
Some of the detractors to a private cloud solution include (1) loss of monetary 
efficiencies and savings gained from an outsourced cloud, (2) it cannot solve traditional 
data implementation difficulties, and (3) the burden of internal network management.43 
3. Community Cloud 
A community cloud provides service for many clients, and falls within the 
continuum of a public and private cloud, and therefore, could be managed by an 
organization or a third party on- or off-premises.44  The tenants of this cloud type are 
related in mission.45  Unlike public clouds, community clouds are designed to 
                                                 
39  Wald, “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.” 
40 Brunette and Mogull, “Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V2.1” 
Cloud Security Alliance, December 2009, at:  http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide.pdf 
(accessed August 3, 2010), 17. 
41  Robert F. Lentz, “Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,” 
42  Wald, “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community,” 18.  
43  Ibid.  
44 Brunette and Mogull, “Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V2.1” 
17. 




accommodate customer desires and requirements (including governance).  The Federal 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) announced the launch of apps.gov, a government 
community cloud, in conjunction with Google publicizing plans to build a community 
government cloud in compliance with government policies.46   
Some of the benefits to a community cloud solution include (1) it is custom built, 
which means it can meld to comply with given standards; (2) it contains the economic 
efficiencies and advantages of a public cloud; and (3) the customer is only required to 
pay for services used.47  One disadvantage to a community cloud solution is the potential 
for data leakage.48 
4. Hybrid Cloud 
The hybrid cloud is composed of two or more cloud types, which are  
Bound by a standard or proprietary technology that enables data and 
application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load-balancing between 
clouds.49   
The hybrid cloud manifests many of the pros and cons of its counterparts.50   
5. Private Cloud Recommended by DoD 
For the highest levels of security, organizations must incorporate a private cloud 
(although costs increase); some public clouds are currently in use by the DoD, where 
sensitivity of data (e.g., personal identifiable information) is not a concern.51  The DoD is 
currently using public and private cloud solutions. 
                                                 
46 Thomas Claburn, “Google Plans Private Government Cloud,” Information Week Government, 
September 16, 2009, at: http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/cloud-
saas/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=220000732&pgno=1&queryText=&isPrev (accessed August 11, 2010). 
47  Wald, “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.”  
48  Ibid.  
49 Brunette and Mogull, “Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V2.1,” 
17. 
50  Wald, “Cloud Computing for the Federal Community.”  
51 Roger Halbheer, “Moving to the Cloud in an Azure Sky: A security Review,” Power point briefing, 




Mr. Robert F. Lentz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, for Cyber, Identify 
and IA, stated, “For many DoD applications, the commercial cloud will be too risky, but 
a private cloud could bring many benefits.”52  Lentz also suggested that the DoD could 
reap financial gains by providing its own private cloud to members of the DoD.53  He 
listed the benefits to capitalize upon as net-centricity, “scalable, on-demand computing, 
virtual monitoring, and provisioning,” and widespread information sharing.54 
D.  CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICE MODELS 
There are three types of cloud service models: Infrastructure, Platform and 
Software as a Service.  The software layer builds upon platform, while platform builds 
upon infrastructure.55 
1. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)  
With this model, a customer rents physical facilities, connectivity, and hardware 
to deploy customer software, operating systems and applications; specific IaaS vendors 
include “Amazon EC2, GoGrid, and FlexiScale.”56  With IaaS, a customer is not required 
to manage/purchase servers and network infrastructure equipment, even though 
configuration management is still required.  One disadvantage to IaaS is that bandwidth 
delays may occur with remote execution.57   
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
This model enables a customer to rent a platform (hardware, storage, or virtual 
computers) to deploy its own specifically created applications; applications are then 
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supported by the provider.58  PaaS is middleware, which can include 
access/identity/authentication management; specific vendors of PaaS include “Force.com, 
Google, AppEngine and Coghead.”59  One specific beneficial use of PaaS is the 
development of standardized software programs.   
3. Software as a Service (SaaS) 
SaaS allows a customer to rent software applications provided over the Internet 
via a thin client/web browser (user does not own or control the infrastructure, servers, 
operating system, or storage); specific SaaS vendors include “Salesforce.com, 
GoogleApps, and Oracle on Demand.”60 
4. Security Tradeoffs between Service Models 61 
SaaS contains the highest integrated security functionality “with the least 
customer extensibility” since the provider bears a majority of responsibility for 
security.62  PaaS allows developers to build applications, hence is “more extensible than 
SaaS;” customers are allowed more flexibility in adding security with the applications 
added, and developed.63  IaaS enables vast extensibility, as the provider must protect the 
infrastructure; the customer is required to secure and manage “operating systems, 
applications and content.”64   
A customer is responsible for security and management where the provider’s 
responsibility in the stack stops.65  SaaS requires SLAs to stipulate responsibilities 
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between the provider and customer, while PaaS and IaaS require customer system 
administration, even though a provider will secure the platform and infrastructure for 
availability.66     
E.  WHAT IS CURRENT IN THE DOD? 
Currently in the DoD, there are four known implementations of cloud computing 
with many more starting up, including use of cloud in Afghanistan for biometric 
support.67  These four implementations include (1) the Army’s Experience Center (AEC), 
(2) Defense Information System Agency’s (DISA’s) Rapid Access Computing 
Environment (RACE); (3) Forge.mil; and, (4) the Air Force’s Personnel Services 
Delivery Transformation (PSDT).68   
1. Army Experience Center (AEC) 
A successor to the Army Recruiting Information Support System, the AEC cloud 
solution is in pilot mode as a public/community cloud providing SaaS,69 as of 2008.  The 
AEC uses Salesforce.com as a customer relationship management tool to track recruits by 
integrating email, Twitter, and Facebook for dynamic social interactions.70  Cloud 
computing increased the speed of response times from recruiters.71 
2. Rapid Access Computing Environment (RACE)  
DISA began using RACE, a private/community DoD cloud providing PaaS, in 
2008.  Starting in October 2009, RACE offered DoD users a “self-service provision 
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operating environment within the highly secured Defense Enterprise Computing Center’s 
production environment.”72  Users can customize and purchase test and computing 
platforms quickly and cheaply.73  DISA implemented “pre-established IA controls” in 
testing and production environments,74 and is in the process of integrating a “host-tenant 
accreditation model” to ensure compliance with the DoD IA Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP).75 
3. Forge.mil  
Forge.mil is a private/community DoD cloud providing SaaS,76 and specifically 
used by DISA to create, test and deploy software and other systems.77  Forge.mil saves 
resources through “economies of scale, ubiquitous delivery…and cross collaboration.”78  
DISA uses a cloud provider platform from CollabNet,79 which services 5,000 users 
across 300 projects; this solution gloats $200 to $500,000 in savings per project, and an 
additional $15 million in “cost avoidance by utilizing an open source philosophy” of 
collaborative development and software reuse.80  Since forge.mil is an open source 
solution mixed with cloud computing, other benefits include version control, traceability, 
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shortened time-to-market, and collaboration.81  This solution is utilized by the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.82   
4. Personnel Services Delivery Transformation (PSDT) 
The Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) implemented a private/community DoD 
SaaS solution, provided by RightNow,83 to increase efficiencies in customer service, 
“knowledge management and case tracking.”84  With this SaaS solution, AFPC 
efficiently completed a manpower reduction initiative, which saved $4 million annually 
while increasing customer service/engagement by 70 percent.85 
F.  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TEN DOMAINS 
Historically, the information system security profession did not contain structure, 
objectives or discipline.86  In the 1980s, members of the profession decided to implement 
structure and provide evidence of their competence through qualifications.87  Professional 
credibility blossomed to fruition in mid-1989 when the International Information Systems 
Security Certification Consortium, Inc., (ISC)2, was formed to develop certification 
programs for information security professionals.88  The consortium adopted “an 
information systems security CBK” with ten domains because of the “broad and 
diversified” nature of technology within business.89  The ten domains stemmed from 
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three tenets of information security:  CIA.  These domains provide a framework for 
information security qualifications and credentials in the field.   
In order to comply with the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA), on May 15, 2008, the DoD established a policy requiring military and civilian 
personnel to obtain commercial IA certifications from (ISC)2 within six months of filling 
an IA billet.90  Depending on whether the DoD employee is a manager or technician 
determines the type of certification required.  A technician, level III, and a manager, 
levels II and III, are required to become CISSPs.91  Along with industry, the DoD 
mandated this level of intense training, inclusive of the ten domains, as a necessity for 
securing its information infrastructure.   
A framework of CIA and a standard within industry and the DoD, the ten domains 
of the CISSP CBK provide a credentialed paradigm for research of threats and 
countermeasures necessary for strengthening the information security posture of cloud 
computing within the DoD.   
G.  DESCRIPTIONS OF THE TEN DOMAINS  
1. Access Control 
Access control encompasses all mechanisms which allow managers to direct and 
restrain not only content, but user behavior/use of a system.92  Managers control subject 
(person, machine, or processes) access to objects or resources in a system, as well as the 
permissions with those resources, i.e., read, write, execute.93  Loopholes in any of these 
mechanisms expose systems to exploitation.  These attacks can take place by insiders or 
outsiders.  Once access is obtained to a network, an intruder or attacker can access 
internal IT infrastructures.   
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2. Telecommunications and Network Security 
The telecommunications and network security domain includes  
the structures, transmission methods, transport formats, and security 
measures used to provide integrity, availability, authentication, and 
confidentiality for transmissions over private and public communication 
networks and media.94 
Other arenas of this domain include voice and data communications for local and 
wide area networks, as well as remote connections to the network.95  More areas 
include firewalls, routers, internet, extranet and internet, and TCP/IP.96   This 
domain specializes in preventing, detecting and correcting communications for 
secure and available services.97   
3. Information Security Governance and Risk Management 
This domain examines policy, data classification, risk assessment, and personnel 
security and training.98  Governance involves implementation of administrative, technical 
and physical controls that secure information systems.  These three areas of governance 
include:  (1) administrative—policy & procedures, risk management, screening 
employees, awareness training, and change control; (2) technical—access control 
mechanisms, resource management, configuration management; and (3) physical—
facility access, facility perimeter protection, intrusion monitoring & environmental 
controls.99 
Information risk management involves identification and assessment of risks, 
reducing those risks to a level that is acceptable, and then implementing countermeasures 
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to maintain that level.100  Risks can involve physical damage, human interaction, 
equipment malfunction, inside and outside attack, data misuse or loss, and errors within 
applications.101 
4. Application Security  
This domain explores effective development and measurement of operating 
system and application security components.102  Within application security, web 
security addresses a myriad of attacks, such as vandalism, denial of service, financial 
fraud, privileged access, and theft of transaction information or intellectual property.103  
Other threats to web environments include information gathering, administrative 
interfaces, authentication and access control, configuration management, input validation, 
parameter validation, and session management.104  Safeguards for mitigating these risks 
include quality assurance programs, web application firewalls, intrusion prevention 
systems, and SYN proxies on the firewall.105 
5. Cryptography  
Cryptography includes methods of disguising and authenticating information 
using technologies such as public key infrastructure, hashes, and symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption algorithms.106  Cryptography is a primary means to provide 
confidentiality of information to deny an unauthorized user access.  Moreover, use of a 
digital signature can provide authentication of a sender as well as non-repudiation, which 
means the sender cannot deny sending the message.  Hashing can provide an integrity 
check for information when passing critical information between entities. 
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6. Security Architecture and Design  
This domain examines how to design and build secure systems.  Some of the main 
issues in securing an information system include use of protection rings, layering and 
data hiding to provide integrity and confidentiality.107  Additionally, security models and 
policy are necessary to ensure proper countermeasures are in place, as well as 
certification and accreditation of systems.  Several threats of concern in this domain 
include maintenance hooks, time-of-check/time-of-use attacks, and buffer overflows, 
which all have corresponding countermeasures such as proper programming, nonces and 
time stamps, and parameter checking.    
7. Operational Security (OPSEC)  
OPSEC is used in identification of “controls over hardware, media, and the 
operators with access privileges to any of these resources,” which is inclusive of auditing 
and monitoring of processes involved in security reporting.108  OPSEC includes all 
activities needed to maintain “network, computer systems, applications and environments 
up and running in a secure and protected manner.”109   Several operational security 
attacks include fingerprinting, packet sniffing, social engineering, and man-in-the-middle, 
while countermeasures include encryption and user training.110 
8. Business Continuity Planning (BCP) and Disaster Recovery Planning 
(DRP)  
BCP and DRP examine methods to ensure continuous operations as well as 
system recovery during disruption.  The steps to developing a BCP include project 
initiation, business impact analysis, recovery strategy, design and development, 
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implementation, testing and continual maintenance.111  A security policy and program 
must encompass a BCP.  Effective maintenance of data backups is also integral to this 
domain. 
9. Legal Regulations, Compliance, and Investigation 
Legal regulations, compliance, and investigation encompass laws and crimes 
involving information systems.  There is a distinction between computer-targeted and 
computer-assisted crimes.  In computer-assisted, the computer is just a tool to help carry 
out a crime, while in computer targeted, the computer is actually the victim of an 
attack.112  The main issues in this domain are jurisdiction, how to present evidence to a 
judge, and the fact that laws do not keep up with technology.  Some attacks within this 
domain include salami, data diddling, excessive privileges, password sniffing, IP 
spoofing, dumpster diving, emanations capturing, and wiretapping.113   
10. Physical and Environmental Security  
Physical and environmental security examines protection of facilities, personnel 
and information systems through environment, entry methods and safety.114  Specific 
areas of interest in this domain include crime prevention through environmental design, 
power, ventilation and fire considerations, and perimeter security implementations.115 
H.  SECURITY ADVANTAGES TO CLOUD COMPUTING 
The security advantages of cloud computing are prolific: 
                                                 
111 Harris, All-in-one CISSP Exam Guide, 780. 
112  Ibid., 847. 
113  Ibid., 903–906. 





 Security automation. The homogeneity of a cloud environment facilitates 
automation in auditing/testing/security/data retention,116  which increases 
the speed of request, change, release, configuration, compliance, capacity, 
and patch management.117   
 Centralization of data.  Centralization of data facilitates “patch[ing], 
upgrad[ing], monitor[ing] and encrypt[ing]” data.118  It also decreases the 
area needed to collocate or provide physical security because the perimeter 
is smaller.   
 Mirroring assists in data recovery. Replicated content or redundancy, as 
well as multiple storage sites, provides an excellent source for both 
disaster recovery and business continuity controls.119  
 Data provisions by zone.  Zones create partitions that block information 
spillage.120  These provisions also can prevent reverberations during a 
denial of service attack. 
 Encryption.  “Encryption of data at rest and in transit” protects 
confidentiality of a user’s data.121 
 Buying security in bulk.  Every type of security measure, (i.e., filtering, 
authentication, access control measures, federated identity management) 
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when implemented on a larger scale, is cheaper, in that “the same amount 
of investment buys better protection.”122 
 Audit and forensic investigation.  With IaaS, customers can create live 
virtual images, and image components, in order to conduct 
investigations.123 
 Ubiquity or infinite availability of data.  Cloud Computing provides 
dynamic resource availability and portability, which could prove useful for 
military operations if properly secured.124 
I.  SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH CLOUD COMPUTING 
There are many security challenges with cloud computing.  Some of the 
recognized challenges or risks include: 
 External reliance for securing data.  Reliance on an external provider for 
security (physical, logical, personnel and security controls) can add risk to 
the CIA of customer data.125  An alarming 22 out of 24 major federal 
agencies reported being “concerned or very concerned” about general 
security risks with cloud computing.126  This dependence on an external 
provider could result in lost data or an inability to transfer data, and 
requires the customer to monitor and examine security controls.127  In a 
survey conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
major agencies reported concerns about “ineffective or non-compliant 
service provider security controls,” lack of security control in delegation 
to third parties, and lack of comprehensive security investigations when 
hiring provider personnel.128  A customer should obtain information about 
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hiring practices as well as oversight of administrative privileges and 
access.129 
 Scarce federal security guidance/procurement strategy.  Comprehensive 
security guidance in the federal government is yet to be available.130  Even 
though the Federal CIO created a cloud computing executive steering 
group, guidance is pending.  Also, NIST is still working on specific cloud 
standards for security guidance.131  In a report released July 1, 2010, the 
U.S. GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget, the 
General Services Administration, and the Department of Commerce 
develop a strategy for integrating security into the procurement process for 
cloud computing services.132   
 Regulation compliance of cloud providers.  Traditional IT service 
providers are subject to audits and accreditation, therefore cloud providers 
should not be exempt.133  
 Identity management problems.  Improper identity management could 
compromise authentication or authorization to access data.134 
 Confusion with responsibilities.  There is often confusion over 
responsibilities regarding incident response, response to an audit finding 
or forensic investigation.135  Agencies voiced challenges with defining 
responsibilities and roles of vendor verses customer in cloud computing 
implementations.136 
 General cloud security issues.  Some of these challenges include: knowing 
the physical location of data and the provider’s adherence to local privacy 
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laws;137 the inability to access proprietary security implementations for 
testing; lack of accountability with system administrators; isolation 
management of data and permissions in a multi-tenant environment (e.g., 
use of encryption);138 ensuring a storage controller or hypervisor does not 
present a single point of failure; DRP and continuity of operations (what 
happens to data in case of disaster, and how long does data restoration 
take?);139 properly using SLAs to securely implement an external cloud 
provider’s services (e.g., investigative support despite logging co-
location);140 and long-term viability141 (CIA of data despite cloud 
company going out of business or transferring service to another 
provider).142 
 Elasticity challenges.  The dynamic nature of elasticity (through use of 
virtualization) brings unique security challenges:143 
 Traversal vulnerability.  The traversal vulnerability allows an individual to 
traverse from one VM to another if managed by the same hypervisor.  This 
vulnerability requires protective administrative separation between 
customers.  This is a major challenge to providers since the premise of 
their financial gains rests on “shared administrative management systems 
(i.e., hypervisors) across multiple virtual customer environments” (p. 3).  
(note: solution is stringent/granular access controls). 
 Encryption.  The traversal vulnerability could easily negate any front end 
encryption for data-at-rest within a virtual milieu.  (note: solution could 
entail research into a provider’s means for encryption in a shared 
environment). 
 Configuration/change management.  A problem with elasticity is 
enforcing strict and proper configuration/change management at the 
PaaS/IaaS level.  (note: solution is stringent/granular access controls, i.e., 
which actions are allowed, as well as when and under what conditions 
these actions are taken; mechanisms for enforcing  change policies are 
also needed). 
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 Integrity within zones.  The challenge of protecting integrity within 
different zones of test, development and production environments. 
 Management control.  Control of management authorizations of 
expanding services. 
Specific DoD cloud computing security challenges.  Many of the above challenges 
will apply to the DoD, but some security challenges are slightly unique.  The DoD might 
experience cyber attacks as a result of wartime missions, such as a tactical cloud solution 
which becomes subject to attack during a mission.144  The DoD uses many different 
classification levels, under different authorities, which may present challenges with 
“sanitization/purging of local storage, data labeling, privilege-based access control…, 
[and] tailoring common operating pictures” to these different levels of access or 
privilege.145  Finally, certification and accreditation is challenging in a provisioned 
infrastructure.146  While the DoD may have a few unique challenges, many of these 
might be similar to what commercial organizations face in protecting their sensitive data 
for financial/proprietary verses wartime incentives. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF CLOUD 
The issues in this section touch on cloud computing revenue projections, future 
uses and implementations, and the way ahead for the federal government and the DoD.  
As this thesis is about securing the cloud computing infrastructure, the future direction of 
this technology provides a framework from which to operate and orient. 
Bountiful Revenues.  Cloud adoption among enterprises is accelerating in an 
explosive manner as IT providers try to capitalize on cloud services.147  IT expert, 
Gartner, Inc., forecasted revenue for worldwide cloud services as $68.3 billion this year, 
with a 16.6 percent increase from 2009.148  By 2014, cloud computing is projected to 
reach revenues of $148.8 billion.149  In the next five years, an estimated $112 billion will 
be spent on SaaS, PaaS and IaaS collectively.150  Due to recessionary concerns, cloud 
computing will gain even more momentum as enterprises cut costs and attempt to create 
efficiencies with business processes.151  In 2009, the U.S. share of cloud services was 60 
percent, but is projected to dilute as other nations begin adoption for a share in the 
market; predictions include: Western Europe—23.8 percent of market (2010), Japan—10 
percent of market (2010), U.K—29 percent of market (2014), and Japan—12 percent 
(2014).152 
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Future Uses.  Some researchers cite cloud computing as the future of electronic 
governance through a green and resource efficient IT solution.153  Currently, the largest 
users of cloud exist in the finance and manufacturing industries, yet communications and 
IT will further leverage cloud computing, along with the public sector.154 
What will Cloud look like in the future?  The director of Microsoft’s new research 
group, Cloud Computing Futures, predicted that future cloud infrastructures will contain 
seamless software upgrade/install without user interference, transparency between 
desktop and cloud environments, increases in power efficiencies, and more “resilient, 
adaptive, and reliable” software.155  Enterprises such as Microsoft or other IT businesses 
will most likely use cloud services in combination with current services.156 
The way ahead with security concerns for the federal government.  While 
enterprise interest in cloud is increasing, security concerns still exist.  Many enterprises 
are concerned about availability of service, and whether or not a vendor is viable and 
mature.157  The Federal CIO stated, "To do more with less, we need game-changing 
technologies. Cloud computing is one such technology."158 The Federal CIO also 
cautioned that the cloud should not be viewed as a financial “panacea” since security, 
operability and privacy concerns still exist.159  Rep. Edolphus Towns, D-N.Y., provided 
his input about the federal future of cloud, “Government-wide implementation of cloud 
computing will be a decade-long journey;” he also voiced hopes that the federal 
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government's launch to cloud computing is well thought out, that the benefits and risks 
are fully examined, and that there are comprehensive plans in place to ensure that we do 
this the right way, the first time.160 
The federal government’s first evident step toward a comprehensive plan was 
posed November 2, 2010, in a draft report, “Proposed Security Assessment and 
Authorization for U.S. Government Cloud Computing,” which combined efforts by 
NIST, GSA, and the Information Security and Identity Management Committee (ISIMC), 
state/local governments, private sector.161  Inside the report was a petition for comments 
via www.fedRAMP.gov website through December 2, 2010.  Clearly, the federal 
government via their CIO Vivek Kundra, is making monumental efforts toward securing 
the cloud. 
The way ahead for The DoD.  The DoD will capitalize on cloud computing as it 
already established RACE, trooptube.tv (a morale solution for troops and families),162 
and cloud-based biometric services in Afghanistan.  More integrated projects are 
projected, and currently on the brink.  These cloud projects will require creativity and 
collaboration with industry and other government organizations to bring to full fruition.   
U.S. Army.  One project in development by the U.S. Army is use of DISA services 
to consolidate disparate email systems into one centralized enterprise system with one 
help desk and one shared enterprise email service.163  The Army CIO projects this effort 
will save over $100 million annually by bringing costs from $100 dollars to $40 dollars 
per user.164  Other efficiencies will be gained by standardization and elimination of 
duplicated efforts.  Inside this project, the Army CIO office is projected to move to the 
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cloud in January 2011, the Army HQs by February 2011, and the rest of Army (1.4 
million common access card holders) by October 2011.165  Following the effort with the 
Army, the DoD has potential plans to migrate European, Transportation and Africa 
Commands, along with the rest of the services in the DoD, to this centralized email 
system.166  The one central help desk will have a 1800 toll free phone number.  Along 
with email plans, DISA is talking with Army CIO about plans to provide an enterprise 
Sharepoint solution.167  One last concurrent/ongoing Army effort is a pilot project with 
300 Army personnel using Google Apps; the pilot is being used to decipher the benefits 
of cloud computing for email in the DoD.168   
U.S. Air Force.  In February 2010, the Air Force awarded a contract to IBM for 
development of a cloud solution that introduces “advanced cyber security and analytic 
technologies” for protecting sensitive data.169  The security effort, when reaching 
fruition, will impact Air Force network security across nine major commands, and 100 
bases in support of 700,000 Air Force active duty personnel.170  According to Lieutenant 
General William Lord, CIO and Chief, Warfighting Integration,  
Our goal is to demonstrate how cloud computing can be a tool to enable 
our Air Force to manage, monitor and secure the information flowing 
through our network.  We examined the expertise of IBM's commercial 
performance in cloud computing and asked them to develop an 
architecture that could lead to improved performance within the Air Force 
environment to improve all operational, analytical and security 
capabilities.171  
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U.S. Navy.172  In April of 2009, Rob Carey, the Navy CIO, suggested cloud 
computing be integrated into NGEN173 and CANES174.  He also proposed “grey clouds” 
on each ship.  Currently, tentative moves by the Navy are in effect: San Diego State 
University is using a Google cloud platform (InRelief.org) to facilitate collaboration of 
diverse organizations responding to disasters.  Carey sees garrison units as primary 
targets for cloud integration efforts over ships, due to the unique nature of ships at sea.  
Yet, during Trident Warrior,175 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud’s IaaS was effective in 
connecting DoD applications and meeting mission storage requirements in support of 
operations.  The implications could be that cloud services could assist Navy mission 
needs.  Moreover, the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division’s Geophysics 
Branch, China Lake, California, signed a contract to use cloud services for weather 
forecasting, which could also take root if fruitful in execution.  
Future DoD uses of cloud computing.  Some proposed projects in the DoD  
include using cloud computing internally (private cloud) for “large-scale planning, 
execution and reporting of program test and evaluation” workflow processes within the 
U.S. Army.176  Other uses could include logistical procurement, and intelligence 
collection and distribution (“storage/processing of tactical Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance (ISR) feeds”).177  Cloud computing could integrate with any solution for 
collaboration or interoperability of many users (i.e., ISR). It could be used for data 
center/system management, system auditing, monitoring/reporting, deployable operations 
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overseas (e.g., for battlespace awareness to track personnel, missions, equipment; 
“simulation and visualization” for “mission planning and training”), and “cyber network 
defense.”178  Other uses of cloud services could include social networking, “data tagging, 
researching and indexing,” and tactical environmental applications.179  Further creative 
uses could be deciphered by using an OpenCrowd Taxonomy diagram that outlines 
service offerings by different companies (note: researcher is not advocating use of any 
particular provider).180   
DoD is likely to continue to pursue cloud computing, especially given that 
President Obama has encouraged its use, specifically where efficiencies could be gained.   
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V. DISSECTING THE TEN DOMAINS 
A. INTRODUCTION: INHERENT RISK WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS 
The fundamental premise of cloud computing is to outsource an IT infrastructure 
from an internally (on-site) managed network operation to an external (off-site) network 
operation.181  With this is in mind, four types of clouds (public, private, community, and 
hybrid) will dictate different security and implementation considerations.  With external 
cloud services (public, community and hybrid clouds), the DoD must meticulously 
scrutinize the level of security.  With a private cloud, the DoD can manage and police 
security for its own information systems.   
The following discusses cloud threats and countermeasures relative to each of the 
ten domains. For the purposes of this research, the analysis of threats and 
recommendations/countermeasures will apply to both internal (private) and external 
(public) cloud implementations. 
1. Access Control 
Access controls are “security features that control how users and systems 
communicate and interact.”182  When a user is prompted for a user ID and password, this 
is considered an access control.  A DoD cloud will require security mechanisms to 
preclude a cloud provider or external entity from pilfering through sensitive data.183  
Threats to access control in cloud computing include frictionless registration processes, 
account hijacking, generic authentication attacks, and insecure identity and access 
management.  These threats and associated countermeasures are discussed. 
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Frictionless registration processes. Frictionless registration refers to the ease of 
an individual gaining access to a cloud without credentials or authorized access.  The Top 
Cloud Threat report, published by the CSA in May 2010, warns that “frictionless” 
registration processes can enable anyone with a credit card access to a cloud; this in turn 
could open the cloud to malicious activities, i.e., spamming and propagating malicious 
code in an anonymous manner.184   
Account hijacking.  Attack methods to hijack an account include “phishing, fraud, 
and exploitation of software vulnerabilities.”185 Once an account is hijacked, the attacker 
can eavesdrop on a user, manipulate their data, and redirect information 
surreptitiously.186 Recently, at a Black Hat Security Conference in July 2009, two 
researchers presented findings depicting how an attacker can “masquerade as any website 
[to]… trick a computer user into [disclosing]…sensitive communications.”187  If 
masquerading is used to mimic a cloud log in screen, a malicious attacker could gain a 
user’s password and access to the account and associated data. 
Generic authentication attacks.188  Cloud computing authentication mechanisms 
are vulnerable to attack.189  Potentially vulnerable authentication data (unless fortified 
with encryption) include: “user identities, passwords, biometric information, [and user] 
access capabilities.”190  
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Countermeasures.  Countermeasures to the preceding access control threats  
include: user training and awareness, using a multifactor authentication/registration 
process (two or more authentication methods of what a user has/is/knows), disallowing 
shared account credentials, proactively monitoring for unauthorized activities, not storing 
secret data on the cloud, and lastly, encryption of data in the cloud as well as 
authentication data.191  Every single interaction in a cloud computing environment should 
be authorized and authenticated.192 
Insecure overarching identity and access management problems.  Challenges and 
corresponding recommendations with identity and access management are summarized 
below.193 
 Identity provisioning. Provide secure/timely management of 
enabling/disabling user access to cloud. 
 Recommendations. Do not use proprietary solutions; use standard 
connectors on service provisioning mark-up language (SPML) schema; 
extend authoritative data repositories to the cloud. 
 Authentication. Utilize strong (two-factor), credentialed cloud security 
authentication mechanisms.  
 Recommendations. For SaaS/PaaS: customer should “authenticate users 
via their Identity Provider and establish trust with the SaaS vender by 
federation” (p. 64); consider utilizing “user centric authentication” (i.e., 
similar to/or those used by Google, Yahoo, OpenID, Live ID) for a “single 
set of credentials valid at multiple sites” (p. 64); evaluate the security of 
this third party before use.  For IaaS: require IT personnel use a dedicated 
virtual private network, similar to/or OpenID or a secure socket layer 
(anything OATH194 compliant) which leverages an identity management 
system; ensure the cloud supports SAML195 so that authentication is 
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delegated to the customer; ensure the cloud provider or private cloud uses 
strong authentication: “one-time passwords, biometrics, digital 
certificates, and Kerberos” (p. 65). 
 Federation. Ensure secure identity management between service 
provider/customer and other entities (confidentiality, integrity & non-
repudiation). 
 Recommendations. Use SAML and WS-Federation196 (prominent 
standards); implementing a federation gateway allows support of a variety 
of “federation token formats” (p. 65);  a federated public single sign on 
(SSO) must be contrasted with a federated private SSO depending on the 
level of security needed and whether interaction with outside agencies is 
important.  The DoD may consider a public SSO when interacting with 
other federal agencies. 
 Authorization & user profile management/access control. Use strong 
access controls and associated policies to verify trusted user; consider a 
serial peripheral interface environment, with audit ability. 
 Recommendations.  Ensure model of access control parallels service/data; 
ensure authoritative policy sources align with privacy and “user profile 
information” (p. 66); verify enforceable policy decision via the appropriate 
authorities; ensure information is logged for auditing purposes; properly 
design identity management for compliance with regulations regarding 
access, e.g., segregation enforcement.197 
General access control countermeasures.198  Cloud computing presents 
innovative management consoles for access controls, as administrative privileges are 
delegated to common users (customers); these require specialized controls to assist in 
prevention of inappropriate use.199  In addition, preventative security measures should be 
applied to mobile devices, including time periods for non-user accounts.  Role-based 
 
                                                 
196 WS-Federation is an identity federation specification which allows different security mechanism to 
collaborate on authentication and identity of disparate users. 
197 All of the information in this figure is expounded upon in the following source: Subra 
Kumaraswamy, Sitaraman Lakshminarayanan, Michael Reiter, Joseph Stein, Yvonne Wilson, “Domain 12: 
Guidance for Identity & Access Management V2.1,” April 2010, at: 
http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide-dom12-v2.10.pdf (accessed August 6, 2010). 
198 Vivek Kundra, “Proposed Security Assessment & Authorization for U.S. Government Cloud 
Computing, Draft Version 0.96,” CIO Council, November 2, 2010, at 
https://info.apps.gov/sites/default/files/Proposed-Security-Assessment-and-Authorization-for-Cloud-
Computing.pdf (accessed November 24, 2010). 




access control policies and the principle of least privilege should be integrated into 
assignment and authentication of user accounts.  Remote access security controls should 
be applied to  
…establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations, 
performing system administration functions, auditing system events, 
accessing event logs, SSH, and VPN (p. 5). 
For user-based collaborative information sharing, user discretion must be 
clarified.  Techniques such as integration of the DoD common access card or a Public 
Key Infrastructure certificate with cloud computing, as done by forge.mil,200 presents 
additional security authentication and authorization as recommended by this domain.  
Conclusions.  The access control domain addressed countermeasures for 
frictionless registration, account hijacking, and authentication attacks such as strong or 
multi-factor authentication.  Recommendations were provided for overarching identity 
and access management issues, specifically involving identity provisioning, 
authentication, federation, authorization and user profile management.  Lastly, generic 
countermeasures were discussed, such as integration of access control with the DoD 
common access card, SAML, WS-federation, and proactive auditing and monitoring.    
2. Telecommunications and Network Security 
This domain discusses threats such as exploitation via cloud hacking, denial of 
service, and manipulation of vulnerabilities within a virtual machine, followed by 
countermeasures to mitigate these threats.  Next, attacks and countermeasures on virtual 
machines vulnerabilities are discussed, followed by generic countermeasures to 
telecommunications and network security in the cloud. 
Nefarious use of clouds.  The CSA identified one of the top six threats to cloud 
security as hackers using a cloud’s IaaS or PaaS for abuse and nefarious activity.201  CSA 
predicts hackers will use cloud computing for nefarious activities such as to host 
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malware, build rainbow tables or maintain CAPTCHA202 hacking farms, and operate 
botnet command and control servers.203   
In a survey of 100 attendees at the 2010 meeting of DEFCON, an annual hacker 
convention held in Las Vegas, the attendees provided the following insight: 96 percent 
said “they believed the cloud would open up more hacking opportunities;” 45 percent 
admitted to hacking the cloud (12 percent hacked for financial gain); 21 percent thought 
SaaS was the most vulnerable aspect of cloud computing; 33 percent discovered 
vulnerabilities in public domain name servers, 16 percent in log files, and 12 percent in 
communication profiles.204 
Countermeasures.  Countermeasures to nefarious use of the cloud include:   
 Increase monitoring/filtering of network traffic (using firewalls, blacklists 
for network blocks, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and anti-virus 
technology) for any unauthorized activity (e.g., credit card scams).205   
 Scrutinize screening of cloud provider personnel;206 require non-
disclosure agreements, while limiting employee access to least 
privilege.207   
 Increase stringency on registration practices.208   
 Ensure meticulous scrutiny of a cloud provider’s patch management 
policy and procedures.209    
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 Verify the cloud provider “restrict[s] data ingress/egress points…to 
mitigate the introduction of malicious software and removal of private 
data.”210   
 Confirm that a cloud provider scans, isolates and replaces any 
questionable instances on the cloud.211   
 Conduct audits of resource usage to assist in detection of malicious use on 
the cloud.212 
Denial of service (DoS) attack.213   Some security experts purport that cloud 
computing is more susceptible to a DoS attack, negatively impacting service availability, 
due to the multi-hosted nature of the network.214  The implication is that once one 
partition is affected, other partitions will also be negatively affected due to the multi-
tenant nature of cloud computing.  Two real-world incidents include:  (1) One Georgian 
blogger with multiple accounts on Twitter, Facebook, Live Journal, Google’s Blogger 
and YouTube was the target of a DoS that took down Twitter’s entire site for several 
hours and slowed service.215  (2) During October 2009, Amazon cloud customer 
Bitbucket experienced a 19-hour outage during a distributed DoS attack.216  According to 
one of Bitbucket’s operators, the company was attacked with a “flood of UDP [user 
datagram protocol] packets coming into our IP [internet protocol], basically eating away 
all bandwidth;” the attack created latency in reading documents stored on Bitbucket’s 
EBS [elastic block storage].217 
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Countermeasures. Some of the countermeasures against a DoS attack within a 
cloud include: “authentication, authorization, filtering, throttling, and quality of 
service.”218 (ISC)2 provides generic recommendations for DoS attacks:  
multiple layers of firewalls, careful filtering on firewalls, routers and 
switches, internal network access control (NAC), redundant (diverse) 
network connections, load balancing, reserved bandwidth (quality of 
service, which would at least protect systems not directly targeted), and 
blocking traffic from an attacker on upstream router.219  
Ensure the cloud provider restricts “dynamic utilization of resources” to set levels to 
counter internal denial-of-service attacks.220  The SLA should stipulate that the provider 
identify all DoS or distributed DoS attack methods, and establish measures (which are 
audited and verified) to mitigate such attacks. 
 Attacks on virtual machine (VM) vulnerabilities (hypervisor/management 
components, and hardware backplane):221 Cloud uses virtualization technology that is 
not protected by standard network security controls; virtual operating systems often lack 
“security-by-default” implementations.222  Without standard security controls, cloud 
solutions experience certain unique attacks.  More specifically, a guest-hopping attack 
occurs when a hacker attacks a “resource isolation mechanism” (i.e., a hypervisor) that is 
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the U.S. CERT as vulnerability CVE-2009-3733, a.k.a the “traversal vulnerability,” 
which states an attacker can traverse from one VM client environment to another if 
managed by the same hypervisor.224  
Countermeasures/recommendations:225 Incorporate layered security controls (i.e., 
intrusion detection/protection systems (IDS & IPS), firewalls, anti-virus and vulnerability 
scanning tools) as well as compartmentalization on VMs to protect management 
components, hypervisors, and hardware backplane; decrease reliance on the security of a 
cloud provider alone.  Ensure quality and pedigree of a cloud provider’s VM before use.  
Create security zones to separate VMs into categories based on: (1) type of use, (2) stage 
of production, and (3) data sensitivity.  Ensure methods of reporting are in place in case 
of an isolation breach.  Ensure regulations on VM isolation requirements are adhered. 
In order to provide boundary protection, any transmitted information must 
undergo inspection by Trusted Internet Connection processes.226  All internal 
communications should be routed via “authenticated proxy servers.”227  The provider 
must define  
…key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components 
associated with system and security administration and isolates those 
tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal 
information system components via physically or logically separate 
subnets.228 
Transmission confidentiality should be protected with a “hardened or alarmed carrier 
protective distribution system” when cryptography cannot be used.229  The provider must 
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define where trusted paths exist, e.g., “system authentication, re-authentication, and 
provisioning of services,” i.e., bandwidth, in order to align appropriate controls where 
necessary.230    
Conclusions. This domain addressed the relevant issues and countermeasures to 
cloud hacking, DoS and VM attacks.  Next, other generic countermeasures in this domain 
were outlined.  Boundary protection is paramount both within and outside of the cloud, 
and the provider must ensure that provisions protect the CIA of a customer’s data.  Some 
of these measures include internal/external layered security controls such as IDS & IPS, 
as well as compartmentalization of virtual instances in order to protect dispersive system 
components.   
3. Information security governance and risk management  
The focus of analysis within this domain will center on information security 
policy as well as risk management/assessment, both of which are administrative security 
controls.  From there, countermeasures are outlined in strengthening the CIA of data.   
Fragmented and incomplete security guidance of cloud computing 
implementation might result in exploited vulnerabilities.  Governance is defined as a 
“structure of relationships and processes” which provides an enterprise direction toward 
its goals.231  Comprehensive security guidance or governance for implementation of 
cloud computing is “fragmented between agencies and so far incomplete.”232  Individual 
efforts by ENISA, CSA, NIST, the Office of Management and Budget, and GSA are in 
progress, but “far from complete.”233  
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Loss of security compliance and regulation to a third party provider. By allowing 
a third party to manage a cloud, a customer loses direct control of security, and thus 
compromises the CIA of its data and operations.234  Even in managing its own private 
cloud, the DoD will need guidance and rules on securing a cloud computing 
infrastructure, and this is currently in development.  
Countermeasures for fragmented governance and compliance issues include: 
(1) “Federal guidance and processes” must specifically address security controls 
to ensure a secure solution for sharing resources.235  Agencies must continue to unite and 
produce consolidated guidance for securing the cloud.  These efforts are in progress and 
are beginning to bear fruit.   
(2) The DoD should stipulate governance requirements in an SLA and audit 
regularly to ensure the cloud provider is adhering. The application of security policy to a 
cloud computing solution should not be an afterthought, but rather part of the process 
during initial planning.236   
(3) CSA created a Cloud Control Matrix which outlines security policies for cloud 
solutions.237  This matrix aligns security controls for cloud computing with 
 
corresponding policies, e.g., Compliance (Audit Planning) aligns with HIPAA 
164.312(b), ISO/IEC 27002-2005 15.3.1, NIST SP800-53 R2 CA-7, and NIST SP800-53 
R2 PL-6. 
(4) Overarching security policies should be considered (see Figure 1). 
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Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT®), 
Version 4.1 (2007) 
http://www.isaca.org 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
privacy/ 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 27002:2005 -- IT -- Security 
techniques -- Code of practice for Information Security Management 
http://www.iso.org/iso/is
o_catalogue.htm 
National Institute of Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53 -- 
Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, 
Revision 2 (Dec 2007) 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publi
cations/PubsSPs.html 
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) 




Other Compliance Resources 
NIST Special Publications (800 Series) http://csrc.nist.gov/publi
cations/PubsSPs.html 
International Standards 
 • ISO/IEC 27003:2010, IT -- Security techniques -- Information security 
management system implementation guidance 
 • ISO/IEC 27033-1:2009, IT -- Security techniques -- Network security --
Part 1: Overview and concepts 
 • ISO/IEC 19792:2009, IT -- Security techniques -- Security evaluation 
of biometrics 
 • ISO 31000:2009, Risk management -- Principles and guidelines 
 • ISO 9001:2008, Quality management systems -- Requirements 
 • ISO 14001:2004, Environmental management systems - Requirements 
with guidance for use 
 • ISO 27799:2008, Health informatics -- Information security 
management in health using ISO/IEC 27002 
 • BS 25999:2007, Business continuity management 
http://www.iso.org/iso/is
o_catalogue.htm 




Health IT for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act passed as part 





BITS Shared Assessments Program Agreed Upon Procedures (AUP) 
Version 5.0 Assessment Guide 
http://www.sharedassess
ments.org/ 
Figure 1.   Overarching Cloud Computing Governance Resources238 
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(5) On July 30, 2010, the Assistant Secretary of Defense built a DoD IA Policy 
Chart that aggregated all policies necessary for orchestrating a trusted global information 
grid.239  While generic to IA, this chart (see link in footnote) can be applied to cloud 
security.240  The chart lists regulation guidance for securing data in transit (section 2.1), 
managing access (section 2.2), assuring information sharing (section 2.3), preventing and 
delaying attackers (section 3.2), preventing attackers from staying (section 3.3), and 
developing and maintaining trust (section 4.1) to list a few.241 
(6) NIST promotes “the effective and secure use of the technology within 
government and industry by providing technical guidance and promoting standards.”242   
NIST recently created the cloud computing security group for guidance and standards in 
securing the cloud.243  Since cloud computing is growing in popularity, NIST is 
beginning to release relevant publications.  In a report in October 2009, NIST articulated 
their roadmap and way ahead as defining minimal standards with each cloud model.244 
(7)  On November 2, 2010, the White House provided a draft of requirements for 
securing cloud computing within the federal government, “Proposed Security Assessment 
& Authorization for U.S. Government Cloud Computing,” which used NIST Special 
Publication 800-53R3 as a foundation for the security controls outlined.245  These 
security controls can be used to guide the DoD once finalized. 
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(7) Some general recommendations/countermeasures on governance in cloud 
computing include:246 
 Periodically inspect to verify a cloud provider’s security capability and 
controls to ensure security requirements are met, and documented into an 
SLA. 
 The customer and cloud provider must agree on goals to support mission 
objectives on information security governance, roles, responsibilities, and 
accountability. 
 Inspect a cloud provider’s security governance to ensure it is sufficient, 
mature and consistent with DoD security management processes. 
 Ensure an external provider uses standards and metrics to monitor security 
management performance. 
Failures in risk management.  Information risk management involves identifying 
and assessing risks, reducing those risks to an acceptable level, and then implementing 
countermeasures to maintain that level.247  Risks that involve physical damage, human 
interaction, equipment malfunction, inside and outside attacks, data misuse or loss, and 
errors within applications could easily negatively impact DoD operations reliant on cloud 
computing.248  In research conducted by the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA), which spans Europe, Africa and the Middle East, 25 percent of 
organizations using cloud computing believe the risks outweigh the benefits for cloud 
computing, yet continue use.249   
Countermeasures.   
(1) Research benefits and risks in a formal risk management process prior to 
implementation, and specify this process in an SLA if using an external provider.250  This 
risk assessment will likely reveal a need for encryption/classification of data, proper 
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authentication, monitoring for intrusions, and redundancies/back-ups for continuity of 
service.251 
(2) Ensure the cloud provider notifies the customer of how risks are mitigated or 
handled.252  For a DoD private cloud, this may entail notifying the chain of command. 
(3) Ensure cognizance of an ENISA risk assessment report on cloud computing 
that outlines risks, vulnerabilities and challenges with associated solutions and 
recommendations.253  The latest ENISA report, 2009, creates a checklist of security-
related questions aimed at meeting business needs of customers.254  These risks are 
highlighted below.255 
 Loss of Governance: customer cedes security governance to a cloud 
provider 
 Lock In: a customer of cloud is locked into using a provider due to lack of 
interoperability between providers 
 Isolation Failure: storage, memory and routing are traversed by 
unauthorized users 
 Compliance: a cloud provider may not provide evidence of security 
certifications required by DoD instructions 
 Management Interface Compromise: unauthorized access is gained via 
web browser/remote access vulnerabilities 
 Data Protection: data is mishandled and an unauthorized person gains 
access to proprietary information 
 Insecure Data Deletion: wiping of data is not done correctly or completely 
 Malicious insider: a system administrator uses access for malicious 
purposes 
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(4)  Incorporate CSA guidance on risk management:256 
 Lack of physical control over infrastructure mandates a more significant 
role for SLAs and contractual agreements. Analyze and identify assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities in order to establish risk management plans and 
assessments, with outcomes identified in SLAs.   
 Due to on-demand provisions with multi-tenant architectures, integrate 
alternatives for vulnerability assessments and penetration tests. 
 Ensure meticulous management and accountability of all equipment 
supporting cloud implementations. 
 Investigate a cloud provider’s supplier security process chain for incident 
management, business continuity, security metrics, and policy compliance. 
 Request documentation and validation of security assessments on facility 
and services to thoroughly investigate risk, frequency of occurrence, and 
timely mitigation.  
 Ensure cloud provider practices due diligence in terms of: financial status, 
reputation, security controls, personnel hiring, business continuity, 
insurance, and service capability. 
(5) Comply with federal government processes for risk management.  The Federal 
Risk and Authorization Management Program, a.k.a. FedRAMP, is an attempt to enable 
adoption of cloud computing through a government-wide authorization process.257  In 
2009, a Cloud Computing Advisory Council (CCAC) was formed to start FedRAMP by 
the Federal Chief Information Officer.  FedRAMP is voluntary because many agencies 
already conduct validated processes to accredit their systems; the intent of the program is 
to provide oversight without duplication of effort.258  The CCAC president is calling 
FedRAMP a “unified, risk management program” which enables common security 
requirements for federal agencies,  compatible security requirements, cost savings/lack of 
duplication of effort, expedient acquisition of cloud services due to pre-authorized 
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packages—providers will now work with one authorization body for risk management;259 
and thus, increase interoperability of government security efforts.260   
Conclusions. The information security governance and risk management domain 
brought to light that security guidance for cloud computing is currently incomplete and 
fragmented.  Additionally, security compliance with cloud computing often involves 
outsourcing security compliance/regulation to a third party provider.  For these reasons, 
federal and DoD guidance will need to address security controls, and these controls will 
need to be outlined in SLAs with third parties.  This chapter also presented overarching 
Information Assurance security policies and governance resources upon which to build.  
It highlighted a new draft document from the White House, “Proposed Security 
Assessment & Authorization for U.S. Government Cloud Computing,” and processes 
which, once finalized, can be capitalized upon by the DoD.  Following, failures in risk 
management were addressed with recommendations and countermeasures.  Overall, this 
chapter showed the need for more governance in securing cloud solutions, as well as the 
need to conduct meticulous risk management for implementations of this new 
technology. 
4. Application Security 
When dealing with application security, the DoD must consider the three levels of 
cloud computing, PaaS, SaaS and IaaS.  This chapter will delve into security issues with 
insecure interfaces, and then specific security issues within each of the three cloud levels, 
followed by countermeasures and recommendations.   
Exploitation of insecure interfaces261 and application programming interfaces 
(APIs). CSA lists insecure or weak interfaces and APIs as a top threat to cloud 
security.262 Interfaces for access control, encryption, and activity monitoring must 
                                                 
259 Chabrow, “Balancing Act: Security Meets Functionality.” 
260 Ibid. 
261 An interface is a point at which components interact whether on software or hardware level. 




encompass secure designs to prevent malicious and accidental circumventions of security 
policy.263  Risks to APIs increase when providers continually add services for customers.  
Examples of weak APIs include: 
Anonymous access and/or reusable tokens or passwords, clear-text 
authentication or transmission of content, inflexible access controls or 
improper authorizations, limited monitoring and logging capabilities, 
unknown service or API dependencies.264 
Countermeasures.  The DoD should analyze and validate: (1) the security model 
for interfaces, (2) the strength of access control and authentication integrated with 
encryption, (3) all API dependency chains,265 and (4) whether server partitions between 
VMs are impermeable,  isolating data on its own physical server (isolation management) 
if not.  
Exploitation of insecure application architectures within PaaS, SaaS, and IaaS.  
Several of the areas of concern with securing application architectures involve: message 
communication, information handling, key management, software development lifecycle 
(SDLC), tools and services, metrics, inter-host communication and economics.   
Countermeasures. In non-cloud environments, “debug and audit logging” usually 
span to local storage, but with a cloud solution, these services must now permeate to 
remote arenas.266  Specific countermeasures for PaaS, SaaS, and IaaS include: 
PaaS: PaaS providers should integrate “built-in application security controls” in 
the programming sections to assist developers in avoiding common application 
vulnerabilities.267  Additional PaaS vulnerabilities and associated countermeasures 
include:268 
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 Secure Message Communication. Multi-tenancy mandates reevaluation of 
trusted paths within two layers: (1) integration and middleware, and (2) 
API.  For messages, WS-Security269 should be used. 
 Sensitive Information Handling. When “data is logged for debugging 
purposes,” use “application provided cryptographic controls” (p. 16).  
Ensure compliance with regulations on audit log retention. 
 Application Key Management. Securely manage application keys and 
credentials. 
 SDLC. Secure PaaS platform and ensure provider follows a secure SDLC.   
 Tools and Services. Use Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) to gain awareness on web-based/n-Tier application 
vulnerabilities/countermeasures. 
 
SaaS: SaaS areas of concern and countermeasures include:270 
 SDLC. Challenges arise with delineation between cloud provider and 
application owner responsibilities on implementing security software 
development measures.  Use the SLA to negotiate changes in trusted 
boundaries and request documentation of security measures, testing, 
logging, audit reporting and periodic inspection of security controls.   
 Metrics.  Require security metrics from third party cloud provider. 
 Tools and Services. Utilize customizable Web Application Firewalls 
(WAF) or a distributed WAF across hardware, CPU271 and 
server/datacenter boundaries with minimal network disruption.    
 Economics.  Providers should provide strong application security to reduce 
breaches, and increase quality of service. 
 
IaaS: IaaS vulnerabilities and countermeasures include:272 
 Secure Application Architecture. Utilize infrastructure controls (as they do 
not exist by default) at the configuration and application level. 
 Trusted Virtual Machine Image.  Hardening of all images and verification 
of security must equal or surpass that of traditional hosts.  A security 
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incident can take place if a compromised OS273 is uploaded to the cloud 
without proper security verification. 
 Hardening Hosts.  Incorporate equal security measures for hardening hosts 
in the DMZ to virtual images.  Incorporate DMZ and cloud-based 
applications with “custom operating system implementations and 
application platform images which only have the capabilities necessary to 
support the application stack” (p. 21).  Decreasing application stack 
capabilities and attack surfaces reduces the number of patches necessary to 
secure the host. 
 Securing Inter-host communication.  Do not permit platform 
administrators of the physical infrastructure unequivocal access to internal 
administration of data. 
 Application Key Management. Modify best practices for secure key 
handling to management of IaaS platform keys. 
 Handling Sensitive Data.  In order to prevent data leakage, apply filtering 
and masking to “operations, exception handling and audit logging” (p. 22).   
 SDLC. Security guidance from CSA needs updating in (1) application 
trust/threat models, (2) assessment tools for application security, and (3) 
guidance on changes to application security architecture. 
Conclusions.  The application security domain addressed exploitation and 
countermeasures to protect insecure interfaces.  It provided methods of increasing 
security for PaaS, SaaS, and IaaS, in the realm of message communication, information 
handling, key management, SDLC, proper tools and services, metrics, economics, and 
inter-host communication. 
5. Cryptography  
Cryptography and key management within the cloud is utilized to protect the 
confidentiality and privacy of data, as well as its integrity.  This chapter covers exposure 
of confidential data via cryptographic attacks and countermeasures, discussion of FBI 
plans to require providers to expose encryption keys, exploitations of data encryption, 
recommendations for in transit and at rest data encryption, key management issues, 
generic encryption recommendations, and homomorphic encryption. 
                                                 




Disclosure of confidential data via various attacks. Data requires encryption 
before placement on the cloud if confidentiality is a concern.274  Steganographic 
techniques can also used to hide or transform data to prevent exposure.275  In a recent 
publication “Trusting the Cloud,” three researchers proposed data protection through 
“well-known cryptographic methods.”276 However, even if data is encrypted, it may be 
vulnerable to attack if the encryption is weak, poorly implemented, or fails to take into 
account sophisticated attacks such as man-in-the middle and side channel attacks.  In a 
man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker places herself between two users to intercept or 
modify the messages transmitted, decrypting and re-encrypting data in the process.277  In 
a side-channel attack, an enemy/attacker places a malicious virtual machine close to a 
targeted machine in order to acquire data that can be useful for cracking encryption 
keys.278   
In addition to confidentiality protection, data integrity can be verified by storing a 
hash “in local memory and authenticating server responses by re-calculating the hash of 
the received data and comparing it to the locally stored value.”279  Availability and 
integrity of data can be verified by using Proofs of Retrievability and Proofs of Data 
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FBI surveillance requirements.  There are concerns that a new legislative proposal 
for an upgraded FBI surveillance program might create security issues for cloud 
computing.281  The proposal requires that (1) communication firms unscramble encrypted 
messages; (2) foreign companies perform intercepts on information in U.S.-based offices; 
and (3) companies with peer-to-peer services redesign their infrastructure to allow 
message intercept.282  This new proposal might enable the government to have access to 
encryption keys, placing data at risk for compromise. Overall, message security and 
encryption keys/processes could be more exposed/vulnerable.  This policy may require 
threat assessment/mitigation to secure data in the cloud.   
Other exploitations of data encryption.  In cloud computing, a nefarious user can 
potentially view file systems and volatile memory images stored to disk when “copying 
off a dormant image of an instance.”283  It is possible that confidential information which 
is “normally encrypted on disk but not in memory, may end up stored on disk in an 
unencrypted format.”284  Additional controls are necessary to encrypt instances when 
stored to disk and during migration between servers.285 
In transit, at rest and backup encryption recommendations.  Data should be 
encrypted while in transit across networks in the cloud, which can be done with ease 
across SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS platforms.286  Additionally, encryption of data at rest 
protects against malicious provider personnel or co-tenants, as well as application 
abuse.287  At rest encryption is commonly available for an IaaS via provider tools, but 
more difficult with PaaS, since customization is required; cloud customers cannot directly 
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implement encryption for data at rest in SaaS, but must request help from a provider.288  
Many cloud providers encrypt data for backup media transparently; this prevents 
unauthorized access to lost or stolen media.289 
Key management issues.  Customers need to ensure that countermeasures are 
taken with key security, access, and recoverability/backup.  These include (1) adherence 
to standards for key management: OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol, 
and IEEE 1619.3;290  (2) protection of keys in storage, transit and backup;291  (3) 
restricted access to keys based on need-to-know and separation of roles;292  and (4) use of 
backup and recovery processes for keys in case of accidental loss or intentional 
destruction.293 
Other encryption recommendations.  Some of the following encryption 
recommendations can create more security for a cloud solution:  Use encryption to 
separate data usage and holding.294  Ensure that key management is separated from the 
cloud provider.295  Ensure encryption processes adhere with industry, DoD and 
government standards.296  Ensure role management and separation of duties is 
implemented with encryption processes.297  Ensure customers are issued different keys, 
and that the cloud provider (if key management is delegated) has a documented process 
for lifecycle management of encryption keys.298  In order to provide non-repudiation,  
use FIPS 140-2 “cryptography (e.g., DoD PKI Class 3 or 4 tokens) for service offerings 
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that include SaaS with email.”299  The provider should define the PKI certificate policy, 
and ensure it is validated by an official approval authority, such as the designated 
approval authority.300 
Homomorphic encryption.  An IBM researcher recently created a homomorphic 
encryption scheme which allows data to be processed in an encrypted state.301  IBM 
asserts that this solution could be used in the future to strengthen the security of cloud 
computing; it would enable providers to “perform computations on data at their clients' 
request without exposing the original data.”302 Although current methods are not 
practical, it is an area of research with potential benefits.  
Conclusions.  Traditional encryption processes can transfer to the cloud, including 
encryption for confidentiality protection, hashing for data integrity, and proofs of 
retrievability/data possession for integrity and availability.  Government surveillance 
legislation can propose risk to data confidentiality for national security purposes, and this 
will affect the cloud along with other information systems.  Cloud customers will need to 
ensure processes are implemented to encrypt their data in transit, at rest, and for backup 
purposes.  Additionally, key management should adhere to security standards, need-to-
know, and separation of duty controls.  Other generic recommendations for cloud 
encryption were presented, along with the potential security enhancements that could 
come with homomorphic encryption if practical methods are found.  Overall, the 
cryptographic domain provided valuable insights into how the confidentiality of customer 
data is protected.     
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6. Security Architecture and Design 
In order to closely monitor resources for unauthorized activities or accesses,303 
cloud customers should verify that proper security coding practices are utilized in cloud 
architecture designs.304  This chapter summarizes potential problem areas within cloud 
to include:  shared technologies, failures in design, and authorization. 
Exploitation of shared technology issues.  CSA identified “shared technology 
issues” as a major threat to cloud security; the vulnerability is that “disk partitions, CPU 
caches, GPUs, and other shared elements were not designed for strong 
compartmentalization.”305  Without strong barriers to isolate and protect the “multi-
tenant architecture” inherent in cloud computing, guest operating systems can obtain 
inadvertent control and influence over other platforms.306   
 The National Vulnerability Database lists exploitation of shared technology issues 
as a “directory traversal vulnerability…,[which] allows remote attackers to read arbitrary 
files via unsuspected vectors.”307  Examples of these types of attacks are “Joanna 
Rutkowska’s Red and Blue Pill exploits, and Kortchinsky’s CloudBurst 
presentations.”308   
 Remediation or countermeasures to this threat include: performing configuration 
audits and vulnerability scans; enforcing patching and rectification of vulnerabilities in 
SLAs; utilizing strong authentication and access control for any operation; monitoring 
for unauthorized changes and malicious activity; isolation management, and 
implementing best practices for configuration and installation.309   
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Failure to design for demand results in loss of availability.  Problems arise for the 
cloud provider when security architecture is not properly planned.  A vendor is required 
to accurately estimate demand for service; when there is error in this calculation and a 
cloud reaches 80 percent capacity or more, servers thrash during movement of “data 
between disks and local memory” resulting in unresponsive computers.310  The resulting 
outage incurs financial and reputation deficits to both cloud provider and customer.311   
Providers should design their security architecture in consideration of (1) accurate 
estimates of customer demand, (2) sufficient slack resources for situations of 
overcapacity and/or restriction of requests for more capacity when established limits are 
reached.312  When a customer assesses bids for cloud computing, the customer should 
assess the cloud provider’s design capacity to enable continuous operations. 
Authorization.  Certification and accreditation is a significant topic in the security 
architecture and design domain.  Currently, the DoD uses the DoD Information 
Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) to ensure information 
systems meet secure design criteria, as approved by a designated approval authority.  
Cloud computing will also need to follow this paradigm.  The federal government just 
submitted a first draft of their proposed assessment and authorization process.313  The 
first chapter outlined security baseline requirements for cloud, founded upon NIST 
Special Publication 800-53R3.314  The second chapter described how clouds will be 
monitored and held accountable for compliance with FISMA, Federal Information 
System Management Act of 2002.315   Chapter three described a potential assessment and 
authorization approach involving a joint authorization process with DoD sitting in as an 
                                                 
310 Paquette, Jaeger, and Wilson, “Identifying the security risks associated with governmental use of 
cloud computing,” 251. 
311 Ibid.  
312 Paquette, Jaeger, and Wilson, “Identifying the security risks associated with governmental use of 
cloud computing,” 251. 
313 Eric Chabrow, “White House Issues Secure Cloud Computing Guidance: FedRAMP Requirements 






approval chair, all of which are based on NIST Special Publication 800-37R1.316  While 
in draft form, the DoD could potentially leverage this federal process, once in place, for 
meeting certification and accreditation requirements, as to not re-invent the wheel.  
Conclusions.  The security architecture and design of a cloud computing solution 
dissected several important areas: establishing isolation management within shared 
technologies; designing architectures for meeting customer demands for service and 
availability; and certifying and accrediting systems before use, while leveraging federal 
solutions.  
7. Operational Security 
The domain of operations security (OPSEC) is concerned with the protection and 
control of distributed and centralized assets, and the daily tasks necessary to keep 
services operating securely, reliably and efficiently.317 The following section describes 
areas of OPSEC that could be problematic in a cloud environment: patching; logging, 
monitoring and audit; and malicious insiders. For these areas, methods of risk mitigation 
are suggested.318  Following, generic OPSEC practices are provided. 
Patching.  Patching is more complicated with cloud computing, as the underlying 
cloud infrastructure must be patched as well as the individual user instances.319  The DoD 
should ensure that a cloud provider patches the “underlying host operating system 
(hypervisor) without impacting the virtualized servers running on that host.”320  If an 
instance is offline during normal patching, processes should be in place to patch these 
instances automatically when they come back online.321 
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Logging, monitoring and audit.  Cloud environments introduce new arenas for 
logging and monitoring.  The DoD should ensure the hypervisor is monitored, as well as 
activity associated with physical servers and virtual instances.322    The distributed nature 
of cloud computing makes log processing difficult, yet important.323   
It is especially critical to monitor virtual instances of operating systems, as they 
are often created with little oversight or audit accountability.324  In addition, virtual 
infrastructures within a cloud computing datacenter can be initiated without physical 
access to the network, allowing the creation of rogue VMs that can be used for side 
channel attacks.325  Virtualization can also negate application and location-based naming 
conventions, which in turn creates logging and tracking problems.326  To mitigate these 
problems, cloud providers should introduce controls to track newly created virtual assets; 
and create/implement standard naming conventions for servers (vice application or 
location conventions) for accurate logging and tracking.327  They should incorporate 
procedures to audit systems when creating virtual instances and each time a virtual 
instance comes online.328 
Malicious Insiders.  CSA lists a top threat to cloud security as malicious 
insiders.329 Part of the concern stems from the need of cloud personnel to maintain high 
levels of access privilege in order to operate, maintain, monitor and audit the systems.330 
A malicious insider (working for the cloud provider) could misuse this privilege and take 
actions that negatively impact business operations through brand, monetary and 
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productivity losses.331 For the military, this could involve compromising secret 
operations during war.  
Some specific methods to mitigate the risk of malicious insiders include:   
 Enforce stringent supply chain management, conduct thorough assessments of 
providers, enforce human resource criteria in SLAs, require compliance 
accountability through reporting, mandate transparency in security 
management, and require a security incident reporting process.332  
 Ensure all supply chain management personnel meet training requirements 
outlined in DoD 8570.01-M, IA Workforce Improvement program.333 
 Require industry certifications for cloud security personnel.  CSA launched 
the Cloud Certificate of Security Knowledge program, a new standard for 
cloud security personnel aimed to increase professional knowledge.334  The 
DoD should specify requirements to obtain this certification in their SLAs. 
 Revoke server privileges immediately upon terminating an employee.   
 Require security checks when hiring individuals. For example, Google Data 
centers holding federal information require that “security checks of datacenter 
employees will be done in conjunction with specific government agencies.”335 
 Do not place data on the cloud which could compromise operational security.  
For example, the Army Experience Center’s cloud solution does not place 
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social security numbers or personally identifiable information on 
forge.com.336 
 Use role-based access controls within the cloud for privileged, ordinary, 
operator, system/security administrators, and Help Desk personnel in 
conjunction with clearances and continual account validation processes.337  
 Restrict access to consoles (physical and virtual) to least privilege.338 
Some general methods to mitigate risks to overall operational security include: 
(1) Operational resilience.339  In order to successfully overcome common threats 
to smooth operations, a cloud’s vital system components must be evaluated 
based on mean time to failure.  Trusted paths340 should be validated using 
“log collection and analysis, vulnerability scanning, patch management and 
system integrity checking” (p. 545).  Redundancies within cloud 
infrastructures (staffing, server, network, power supplies, drives, storage, 
spares, and backup/recovery systems) should be automatically integrated to 
ensure any system disruption goes unnoticed for cloud customer operations.  
(2) Asset protection.341  Information assets that are assigned to a cloud might not 
be protected at a level commensurate with their value. The DoD should 
stipulate the value of tangible and intangible assets to ensure controls are 
appropriately integrated with cloud solutions; this can be accomplished by 
using a classification system.  All assets should be considered, including data, 
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software, classification markings, and devices.  Mandatory and discretionary 
access controls should be integrated into the cloud as applicable.342 
(3) Managing security services and technologies.343  Diverse technologies in the 
cloud are required to control “change, configuration, incident and problem 
management.”344  Security operations involve monitoring security 
technologies (intrusion detection and prevention systems, firewalls, email 
security services) to ensure they are effective in maintenance of a reliable and 
resilient cloud.  These technologies should integrate with cloud to establish 
boundary controls (separation of trusted and untrusted virtual instances); 
monitor and report (audit logs, security event management, log management), 
intrusion detection/prevention (detect and prevent attacks with signature 
matching, protocol/statistical anomaly, and heuristics), vulnerability 
management systems (find vulnerabilities in network, host and application 
systems on the cloud), anti-malware systems (strategically placed, continually 
updated), media management (using encryption; degaussers for erasing).   
(4) Key operational practices.345  Other key operational practices required in the 
cloud will include archival, backup, and recovery procedures (well 
documented processes); incident management (integrating people, processes 
and technologies), problem management (handling defects), change 
management (utilizing a configuration control board), configuration 
management (with guides and standards for each operating system/application 
within the cloud), patch management (involving security and system 
administrators), security audits and reviews (third party verified security 
compliance).    
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Conclusions.  This section specifically addressed patching; logging, monitoring 
and auditing; and the malicious insider.  Following, general OPSEC practices for cloud 
were provided.  This domain requires attention to detail in the daily tasks that involve 
securing the cloud in order to protect DoD assets.  Since the DoD could be hiring a cloud 
provider to provide a private solution, the responsibilities for ensuring operational 
security require continued dialogue and partnership.   
8. Business Continuity Planning (BCP) and Disaster Recovery Planning 
(DRP) 
The emphasis of this domain is to ensure continuous service without external or 
internal interruptions.  Since the DoD conducts many mission critical operations, the 
reliability of the cloud solution is of paramount significance.  This domain addresses 
threats and countermeasures associated with an external provider terminating business; 
cloud outages, data loss and latency; and cloud provider lock-in.     
Vendor terminates business without sufficient notice.  The availability of data is at 
risk if a provider terminates business without sufficient notice for transition or retrieval of 
data.346  Such situations may impact secure operations of a business, as evident in 2008 
when an external cloud vendor named Linkup terminated operations with little notice to 
20,000 customers.347  This incident resulted in negative repercussions; for one CEO, only 
55 percent of company data was saved, while the status of the rest was questionable.348   
Cloud outages, data loss, and latency pose threats to cloud availability.  
Environmental factors (i.e., hurricane causes power outage), technical failures, malicious 
threats, malware, and user error can lead to cloud outages and lost data.  Resource 
overloading or denial of service conditions within a shared cloud environment could 
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impair availability for all users of the shared resources.349  Latency problems can also 
arise in clouds, for example, as a result of the distance between a user’s applications and 
data on the cloud or as a result of slow encryption services.350 
Lock-in with one provider (loss of interoperability and business continuity). 
“Lock-in” is a major hindrance to “data, application and service portability.”351  Due to a 
lack of standards with cloud, customers may become “locked in” to one provider and 
unable to move data from cloud to cloud.352  This is common, as mentioned in the 
application security domain, among APIs (they are proprietary instead of standardized); 
since many APIs are not publicly available, it is difficult to create interoperability among 
multiple venders.353  The problem of lock-in can become particularly serious if a 
provider goes out of business, leaving the customer not only without a provider, but also 
without a means of porting data to a new provider.   
Some preventative measures to this domain include:354 
 Inspect and engage with provider on their BCP and DRP.  Both plans 
should map to recognized standards, i.e., BS 25999; reviewed, exercised 
and validated periodically; and actively supported by management.355  
 Request back-up copies of data once a month from providers; this is 
excellent in case of environmental failure or cloud provider going out of 
business.356 
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 When selecting encryption services, balance objectives with 
confidentiality and security with those for performance and availability.357 
 Define and ensure cloud provider understands DoD recovery time 
objectives (RTOs); verify “technology roadmaps, policies, and operational 
capabilities” supporting these requirements.358 
 Ensure questions about availability are raised with the cloud provider, i.e., 
“what happens to your organization’s applications and data in the event 
that the provider goes out of business?359  The BCP/DCP should cover 
these questions.   
 Ensure “scheduled data backup and safe storage of …backup media” can 
provide a minimum level of availability. 360   
 Ensure a cloud provider gives priorities to cloud instances for availability 
and appropriate resource utilization.361 
 Ensure a cloud provider takes measures to ensure reliability, for example, 
by executing “applications across multiple physical servers.”362   
 Ensure a provider’s BCP and DRP includes an integration strategy for 
portability of data, in which partnerships with diverse technology vendors 
allow synchronization and business continuity.363 
Conclusions.  Since the terrorist attacks since 9/11, the private sector plans for 
recovery during emergencies and maintaining business continuity as stipulated by Title 
IX, “9/11 Commission Recommendation Act of 2007.”364  Since mission-critical 
operations are ongoing during war, the DoD should stipulate appropriate standards to 
protect the availability of data directly supporting mission-related functions.  The 
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standards can be verified through a validated and exercised BCP and DRP developed by 
the DoD and any third party provider, as supported by senior management.   
9. Legal Regulations, Compliance and Investigation 
The legal regulation, compliance and investigation domain specifically addresses 
SLAs, blurred responsibilities between providers and customers, the need for incident 
handling processes, compliance with legal regulations, intellectual property and privacy, 
cloud employee monitoring and surveillance, the utility of cloud security experts, and the 
highlighted significance of IT and legal personnel working together in formulation of the 
SLA or contract. 
Problems associated with SLAs. In a recent study by Yankee Group on 41 cloud 
computing companies, researchers found that “cloud vendors offer poor service 
guarantees and limited financial redress if their service fails,” while “[g]et-out clauses are 
rife, and robust privacy policies are rare.”365  In Yankee Group’s study, only half of the 
41 cloud companies offered SLAs, and none of the 41 companies provided financial 
reparations for data loss.366    
The DoD must ensure that SLAs with cloud computing providers are clear, 
meticulous, meaningful, and comprehensive.  Typically, an SLA stipulates timelines for 
fixing problems (availability), but the DoD must ensure it also protects confidentially and 
integrity.  The following are examples of questions that should be answered in a few of 
the domains: 
 Physical and environmental security: Where is the data physically being 
stored (i.e., allied countries with privacy laws appropriate to protection 
from disclosure)?  Is the computer center and building infrastructure in 
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are made for environmental/natural (i.e., fire, heat), man-made (i.e., access 
control to areas/buildings), and political threats or disasters affecting 
physical security of data location?367   
 Business continuity/disaster recovery: What preventative measures does 
the cloud provider use (i.e., backups, redundancies) to ensure data is 
continually available?   
 Legal, regulation, investigation and compliance: “Does the cloud provider 
meet legal and regulatory requirements?368  Will a cloud provider give 
timely assistance to meet investigative/audit requirements?   
 Telecommunications and network security: Will a cloud provider isolate 
data properly?  How will a cloud provider protect infrastructure, platform 
and software from hacking? 
 Information security governance and risk management: Will the cloud 
provider’s security policies and contract align with DoD regulations?369  
Does the SLA incorporate requirements of the customer’s risk 
management plan to protect the CIA of the data?370 
Blurred responsibility between customer and external or third party cloud 
computing provider creates security vulnerabilities for exploitation.  The legal issue of 
responsibility is a problem with providers; for instance, where are the lines of delineation 
between the cloud storage provider or the entity leasing storage for its applications and 
data?371  Most CIOs voice concerns over security with cloud computing due to 
movement of the trust boundary (delineation of security responsibilities) that exists 
between a provider and the customer.372  CSA purports that in many cases with IaaS and 
PaaS, much of “orchestration, configuration and software development” is conducted by 
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the customer that responsibility stays with the customer.373  These lines of responsibility 
require accountability and clarification. 
A security model must be developed to promote CIA. Aspects of this model need 
to be scrutinized, outlined and verified in minute details of an SLA.  Providers and 
customers must be cognizant of responsibilities within virtual environments.374  Cloud 
customers need to understand system management process for access control, change 
management, and vulnerability management, as well as patching and configuration 
management.375  Some providers today create and utilize dashboards to increase visibility 
and remove guesswork in the service instrumentation/metrics between provider and 
customer.376 
Problems with incident response.  Security incidents are defined as “any real or 
suspected adverse event in relation to the security of computer systems or computer 
networks” or “the act of violating an explicit or implied security policy.”377  Incident 
reporting is often negatively affected by concerns over confidentiality.378  Security 
incidents can occur: (1) when a vulnerable application is uploaded or deployed to a cloud 
environment; (2) as a result of inherent architectural flaws, (3) from discrepancies in 
hardening processes, or (4) from a miscellaneous user oversight.379  Incident handling 
will differ based on data location, but a process for handling incidents must be in place.  
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Several strategies for incident handling include: 
 Define what constitutes an incident (i.e., data breach) and events (i.e., 
suspicious IDS alerts) to a provider before using services.380 
 Verify a cloud provider’s incident response program and notification 
chain.381 
 Verify the cloud provider’s detection/analysis tools comply with DoD 
instructions.382 
 Log, report and investigate security incidents at the hypervisor level.383 
 Since cloud computing uses virtual servers, define methods of evidence 
collection in advance.384   If a VM is powered down, the host operating 
system can still access the disk image; this allows tampering of potential 
forensic data.385 
Compliance deficiencies.  Providers need to comply with information system 
security requirements whether internal DoD policy, ISO policies or certification and 
accreditation processes.  Without attention to security compliance, the CIA of data could 
become easily compromised.  In a study done by security analysts, gaps in compliance 
with ISO 27002 were discovered in cloud computing; following, these analysts 
recommended twenty mitigating security strategies that are dispersed throughout this 
thesis.386 
Several strategies to mitigate compliance deficiencies include:  
 An SLA with an external provider can stipulate security standards, 
certification/accreditation, and regulatory requirements.  Many of these 
general standards were covered under governance in this thesis.  Many are 
yet to be developed. 
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 For management of information security systems, providers must comply 
with ISO/IEC 27001/27002, and achieve ISO/IEC 27001 certification.387  
Providers must verify compliance with evidence via audit logs, change 
management paperwork, and test procedure reports.388 
 Providers should allow auditing by the customer for verification 
purposes.389   Providers/customers should comply with SAS 70 Type II 
for auditing requirements.390   
 “Standard procedures, tools, [and] data formats” should be incorporated 
within industry as developed.391   
 Providers/customers should verify new instances on a cloud comply with 
“defined, tested and approved specifications.”392 
 “Google Apps for Government” is “the first suite of cloud applications to meet 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) certification and accreditation 
for the U.S. government.”393   
Intellectual property and privacy.  In the context of information system security, 
this domain also covers protection of intellectual property (from copy or use without 
compensation to the owner), and privacy (the rights and obligations of individuals and 
organizations with respect to the collection, use, retention, and disclosure of personal 
information).394  In cloud computing, these same laws (copyright, patent, trademark, 
trade secret, licensing issues) apply, and thus, technical, administrative, and policy 
controls unique to cloud computing must establish appropriate protections.  A customer 
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must retain ownership of its information in the “original and authenticable format.”395  
Privacy laws vary based on jurisdiction, yet OECD establishes generic principles and 
recommendations from which cloud security legislation can develop.    
Employee monitoring.  Another significant issue in this domain is employee 
monitoring and surveillance.396  The levels of third party providers in a cloud computing 
environment quickly spiral out of a customer’s control, and the time required to verify a 
provider is self-monitoring its employees becomes an afterthought.  Stipulating that a 
cloud provider and third parties require employee-signed “acceptable use policies” could 
assist in prevention of employee abuse, while monitoring could deter the same employee 
misuse.397  This control assists in maintaining cloud computing employee productivity 
and efficiency, reducing security incidents, and controlling for the insider threat.398   
Liability with due care and diligence.  The issue of monitoring employees sheds 
light on liability.  Within the DoD, corporate assets in a cloud solution may be handled by 
a third party cloud provider; in this case, due care and due diligence of proper protections 
is paramount.  For instance, if a cloud provider does not meet regulatory requirements in 
the percentage of an IT budget devoted to security, he could be held liable to legal 
repercussions.399  An SLA will require legal reviews to verify that regulatory 
requirements are specific enough to establish and enforce due care and diligence.   
Incidents, forensics, and a cloud security expert.  It is important to establish 
incident response processes, procedures and policy within a cloud computing solution.  In 
addition, staff positions in cloud security should be established within organizational and 
national-level CERTs.  Without a cloud expert, the phases of triage, investigation, 
containment, analysis and tracking; recovery and repair; and debrief/feedback within a 
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cloud computing incident response will be more difficult.400  Technical forensics for 
crime investigation and incident response in a cloud environment will require tailored 
approaches, specifically with isolation and containment of data.  Such cloud security 
experts on an IT organizational staff, positioned within the Information Assurance 
section, could assist with clarifying responsibilities of a customer verse provider in 
incident response, forensic investigation, and daily security maintenance.  
Conclusions.  Legal considerations are prolific and span the scope of the ten 
domains.  Once a customer decides upon a provider, the SLA will be the key to 
negotiating and outlining provisions from pre-contract, contract term, post-contract 
monitoring, and termination.401  Due to technical nuances of cloud computing, it is 
recommended that legal staff work closely with a customer’s cloud security expert in the 
negotiation.402  There is a lack of precedence in legal issues within cloud computing from 
which to build, especially in digital evidence, which makes this domain more 
challenging.403  Other challenges include holding a third party responsible.  This is 
addressed using similar methodologies (legal contracts/SLAs) as incorporated in past 
government situations for contract services.  Cloud computing is a new arena for 
efficiency and monetary gains, and requires addressing appropriate legal issues in 
advance, in order to prove viable and useful for furthering missions leading to success in 
the DoD.       
 10. Physical and Environmental Security 
Physical and environmental security for cloud computing presents threats in 
several areas: data location, audit transparency, facility/server room security, server 
isolation, data deletion, tempest and proper separation.  This chapter addresses these 
threats and associated countermeasures. 
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Data location could lead to compromise.  If DoD data is stored in a foreign 
country, the government of that country could potentially seize equipment holding the 
data.  This might happen, for example, if DoD data is stored on a device that also holds 
the data of a criminal enterprise that the government is investigating. 
To mitigate this risk, SLAs should stipulate where data may be stored and how it 
is to be protected during a criminal investigation.  A cloud provider for the DoD should 
“commit to storing and processing data in specific jurisdictions,” and “obey local privacy 
requirements”404 in a manner equivalent to DoD-level guardianship.405  This requirement 
is also backed by U.S. privacy laws, such as the U.S. Safe Harbor program, which 
mandates knowledge of data storage location at all times.406  This law encourages 
providers to stay within legal jurisdiction and decrease security risks.407  
Lack of transparency/openness to audit. Customer auditing plays an important 
role in assuring that proper security standards are met, including standards for physical 
security.  Since some providers may not allow auditing, the DoD should only use 
providers that do.  A cloud provider’s security posture (including physical/environmental 
controls/personnel hiring practices/privacy controls over data) must be transparent408 and 
accountable to the DoD, and thus open to inspection/audit, and documented in an 
SLA.409 
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An audit should include the following actions relating to physical security: 
 Perform onsite inspections of cloud facilities on a periodic basis.410 
 Identify physical interdependencies within a provider’s infrastructure.411   
Verify a cloud provider demonstrates “comprehensive 
compartmentalization of systems, networks, management, provisioning, 
and personnel.”412   
 Ensure uninterruptible power supply systems are in place for continuity of 
power and continuous operations.413  
 Inspect documentation of internal/external security controls to validate 
compliance with industry standards.414 
Improper facility physical security/environmental controls. The CIA of DoD data 
could become compromised if a building were to collapse for any reason, due to an 
environmental issue or non-compliance with building codes.  In June 2009, 
Amazon.com’s EC2 data center experienced repercussions of a lightning strike, which 
resulted in a four hour outage.415  Facility construction considerations/requirements 
(roads, barriers, doors, locks, safes, windows, lighting, and crime prevention through 
environmental design) must be based on a defense in depth approach and in compliance 
with DoD physical security standards.416  Environmental protection/controls (fire, power; 
heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC), water) should be in place with 
appropriate alarms.417 
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Lack of proper security in the server room.418  The server rooms used by cloud 
providers may be vulnerable to natural disasters and intentional acts of “sabotage, 
espionage and data theft.”419  DoD customers must make sure that their providers employ 
adequate server room security, to include: a single controlled entry/exit, rack locks, 
dielectric fiber cabling or optical isolators (lightning protection), back-up generators 
(power failure prevention), proper HVAC, and least privilege or need-to-know access 
control.420  
“Insecure or incomplete data deletion/data persistence.”421 Compromise 
becomes commonplace when media controls/destruction processes are not in place.  
When requested by the DoD, an external cloud provider must destroy or remove data and 
render it unrecoverable from the cloud or an external device.422  In some cases, data 
remnants can only be removed via physical destruction.  Customers must verify a cloud 
provider records current and past records (throughout full lifecycle) for removal of 
physical and virtual instances.423 
Improper tempest/shielding.  Emanations from computer equipment can reveal 
sensitive data.  To mitigate this risk, cloud providers should shield buildings, computers, 
wireless antennae, cables, keyboards and screens.424  In some cases, DoD surveillance 
and tempest technologies might provide better protection than commercial, in which case,  
private clouds using these resources might be preferable to a public cloud. 
Lack of isolation/segregation. Without physical separation in a multi-tenant 
environment, the traversal vulnerability can compromise data from a VM sharing the 
 
                                                 
418  Tipton, Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, 647–652.  
419 Ibid., 650. 
420 Ibid., 579–675. 
421 Catteddu and Hogben, “Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks, and Recommendations for Information 
Security,” 10. 
422 Ibid., 41. 
423 Durbano, Rustvold, Saylor and Studarus, “Securing the Cloud.” 




same VM or physical server.  Cloud customers should verify that the physical machine 
holding their data, if shared with other users, contains access controls to prohibit 
interference, whether intentional or malicious.425  
Conclusions.  The physical domain circa cloud computing presents several 
opportunities for compromise without sound security implementations.  Physical 
compartmentalization within a virtual and multi-tenant environment is one safeguard that 
mitigates the risk of a malicious attacker exploiting the hypervisor vulnerability. Other 
safeguards include physically securing facility and equipment with controls to prevent 
unauthorized access to valuable data.     
                                                 






The ten domains provide a credentialed standard of security to protect the CIA of 
cloud computing.   
 The access control domain addressed countermeasures for frictionless 
registration, account hijacking, and authentication attacks such as strong 
or multi-factor authentication.  Recommendations were provided for 
overarching identity and access management issues, specifically involving 
identity provisioning, authentication, federation, authorization and user 
profile management.  Lastly, generic countermeasures were discussed, 
such as integration of access control with the DoD common access card, 
SAML, WS-federation, and proactive auditing and monitoring.    
 The telecommunication and network security domain addressed the 
relevant issues and countermeasures to cloud hacking and to DoS and VM 
attacks.  Boundary protection is paramount both within and outside of the 
cloud, and the provider must ensure that provisions protect the CIA of a 
customer’s data.  Some of these measures include internal/external layered 
security controls such as IDS & IPS, as well as compartmentalization of 
virtual instances in order to protect dispersive system components.   
 The security architecture and design domain dissected several important 
areas: establishing isolation management within shared technologies; 
designing architectures for meeting customer demands for service and 
availability; and certifying and accrediting systems before use, while 
leveraging federal solutions.  
 The application security domain addressed exploitation and 
countermeasures to protect insecure interfaces.  It provided methods on 




communication, information handling, key management, SDLC, tools and 
services, metrics, economics, and inter-host communication. 
 The cryptographic domain highlighted that traditional encryption 
processes can transfer to the cloud, while encouraging encryption in 
transit, at rest and for backup purpose; and noted the potential use of 
homomorphic encryption techniques to secure confidentiality in the future.   
 The security architecture and design domain discussed establishing 
isolation management within shared technologies; designing architectures 
for meeting service and availability demands; and certifying and 
accrediting systems and leveraging federal solutions.  
 The OPSEC domain highlighted the importance of patching; logging, 
monitoring and audit; and personnel practices to protect against the 
malicious insider. 
 The BCP and DRP domain addressed the importance of ensuring the 
availability of data that is needed for mission-related functions.  BCPs and 
DRPs must be validated and exercised by the DoD and any third party 
provider. 
 The legal regulation, compliance and investigation domain specifically 
addressed SLAs, blurred responsibilities between providers and 
customers, the need for incident handling processes, compliance with legal 
regulations, intellectual property and privacy, cloud employee monitoring 
and surveillance, and the need for cloud experts. It highlighted the 
significance of IT and legal personnel working together in formulation of 
the SLA or contract. 
 The physical and environmental security domain identified threats and 
countermeasures in several areas: data location, audit transparency, 





Through use of the ten domains, the DoD can better mitigate threats that are 
inherent in this new cutting edge technology.  By taking precautions with the new 
technology of cloud computing, the DoD can reap benefits in efficiency while ensuring 
the CIA of their data remains intact.   
Recommendations for future research include readdressing this thesis in five years 
when cloud computing technology has matured.  Any of the ten domains could easily 
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